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Most state supreme court justices have no choice but to take into 
account “The Will of the People.”  In thirty-eight states, justices stand 
for reelection; in eighteen states, voters can overturn state supreme 
court decisions by amending their constitutions through the initiative 
process; many state supreme courts cannot steer away from contro-
versy by refusing to hear politically charged cases.1  But how does 
democratic accountability influence state court decision making?  On 
the one hand, state justices subject to election almost certainly take 
into account the risk of electoral defeat.  At the same time, these jus-
tices must also reach out to individuals whose interests may not align 
with the popular will, most notably campaign contributors. 
In the pages that follow, we will advance a preliminary, common- 
sense argument about the role of public opinion in state supreme 
court decision making.  First, we will argue that public opinion is far 
more salient to justices subject to contested judicial elections than to 
justices who are more politically insulated.  For this very reason, path-
breaking state courts—state courts that take the lead in extending 
rights and defining the bounds of the law2—are subject to fewer 
democratic controls than state courts that steer away from political 
controversy.  Second, the mass public is generally uninterested in pol-
itics (especially state supreme court decision making) and, conse-
quently, there are a limited number of high-salience issues in which 
the justices have strong incentive to take voter backlash into account.  
Third (and correspondingly), state justices—especially those subject 
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 1 See Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account:  Toward a State-
Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1639–53 (2010) 
(discussing the various aspects of state constitutions and state courts that engender a 
greater responsiveness to public opinion). 
 2 See, e.g., id. at 1674–85 (discussing path-breaking state supreme courts in the area of gay 
marriage and specifically noting that the state supreme courts that have ruled on the is-
sue and extended marriage to homosexual couples have fewer democratic checks). 
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to contested elections—are likely to take into account the views of 
campaign contributors and interest groups that run television ads. 
In making these points, we do not mean to suggest that state jus-
tices are not principally interested in advancing their vision of good 
legal policy.  Moreover, state justices may also be attentive to their 
reputation with state officials, elites (journalists and academics), and 
the mass public.  As it turns out, the structure of state judicial systems 
figures prominently in this calculation.  Justices who run in contested 
elections, like other politicians, personally value their reputation with 
the mass public much more than justices who sit on politically insu-
lated courts.3 
Our essay will be divided into three parts.  Part I will provide a 
quick tour of the ways in which state judicial systems are subject to 
one or another form of democratic control.  Part I will also highlight 
the increasing importance of judicial elections to state supreme court 
justices.  Part II will discuss how state justices are well positioned to 
take political consequences into account and, more generally, how 
the values and aspirations of state supreme court justices may be tied 
to the characteristics of their judicial system.  Parts I and II, moreo-
ver, will lay out the basic facts which back up our claim that the sa-
lience of public opinion is tied both to differences in state judicial 
systems and to the electoral significance of a particular issue.  Part III 
will discuss the evidence we have gathered about the influence of 
public opinion and campaign contributions on state supreme court 
decision making.  Overall, the evidence backs up our central claims, 
including our claim that politically insulated state supreme courts are 
likely to play a path-breaking role on highly charged political contro-
versies. 
Before turning to Part I, two observations:  one about the impor-
tance of our project and one about the limits of the empirical evi-
dence that backs up our conclusions.  First, the relationship between 
public opinion and state supreme court decision making is tremend-
ously important.4  State supreme courts have eclipsed the U.S. Su-
preme Court in shaping the meaning of constitutional values.  State 
supreme courts decide around 2,000 constitutional law cases each 
 
 3 For an analogous argument (from which we will draw), see generally Lawrence Baum & 
Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 
1515 (2010) (arguing that justices on politically insulated courts, like the U.S. Supreme 
Court, are especially interested in their reputation among one or another elite audience). 
 4 Of course, the relationship between public opinion and U.S. Supreme Court decision 
making is tremendously important.  Witness, for example, the very fine papers published 
in this Symposium and Barry Friedman’s excellent book, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 
(2009). 
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year; the U.S. Supreme Court decides around thirty.5  More signifi-
cantly, state supreme courts sometimes interpret their constitutions 
to provide protections above the floor set by the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Examples include abortion, gay rights, takings, religious liberty, and a 
host of criminal procedure protections.6  Second, as we will explain in 
Part III, there is very little available information about the relation-
ship between public opinion and state supreme court decision mak-
ing.  Notwithstanding the profound and ever-growing influence of 
state supreme courts, their decision making receives scant attention 
from journalists and legal academics.7  For example, there is limited 
newspaper coverage of state court decisions and next to no opinion 
poll data on voter attitudes towards state supreme court decisions.  
Consequently, the analysis in this essay should be seen for what it is—
a preliminary attempt to discuss the relationship between state su-
preme court decision making and public opinion. 
I.  DEMOCRATIC CHECKS ON STATE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 
State supreme courts are far more vulnerable to political influ-
ence than are federal courts.8  With the exception of Rhode Island, 
state justices do not have life tenure (although justices in Massachu-
setts and New Hampshire serve until seventy and are not subject to 
reelection or reappointment).9  Many state supreme courts cannot 
use standing to sue, certiorari denials, or other “passive virtues” to ex-
tricate themselves from politically controversial cases; indeed, the 
constitutions or statutes of eleven states authorize state lawmakers or 
governors to seek advisory opinions from state supreme courts.10  Fi-
 
 5 Devins, supra note 1, at 1635. 
 6 See id. at 1636. 
 7 For this very reason, the Conference of State Chief Justices has called for law schools to 
teach courses in state constitutional law and embraced a State Supreme Court Initiative 
designed to encourage news coverage and academic commentary of state supreme court 
decision-making.  Conference of Chief Justices Resolution 1 (Feb. 4, 2010) (on file with 
author).  Likewise, recognizing real limits in available data on state judicial elections, 
Washington University in St. Louis is sponsoring the State Judicial Election Initiative.  The 
Judicial Elections Data Initiative, WASH. UNIV. ST. LOUIS, http://jedi.wustl.edu/. 
 8 See infra notes 69–78 and accompanying text. 
 9 In New Jersey, state justices are subject to gubernatorial reappointment but then serve 
until they are seventy.  Before 2010, reappointment was fairly routine.  In May 2010, how-
ever, Governor Christopher Christie refused to reappoint a sitting Justice so that he could 
appoint someone “who he said would show the restraint that was missing from the court.”  
Richard Perez-Pena, Christie, Shunning Precedent, Drops Justice from Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 
2010, at A22. 
 10 See generally Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”:  Rethinking the Judicial 
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001) (discussing the differences that exist between 
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nally, state constitutions are far easier to amend than the Federal 
Constitution, with some state constitutions authorizing constitutional 
amendment by citizen initiative. 
Differences between state constitutional systems and the federal 
system are so dramatic that the models political scientists employ to 
discuss the relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
American people have no application to democratically accountable 
state systems.  Consider, for example, the argument that Supreme 
Court Justices simply vote their policy preferences and need not take 
into account public or lawmaker backlash.  Political scientists who 
make this argument point to life tenure, docket control, and the 
near-impossibility of amending the Constitution to override a Court 
ruling.11  Most state supreme court justices are without any of these 
protections and, consequently, state justices are apt to take backlash 
risks into account. 
At the same time, there are dramatic differences among state 
courts.  There is a wide range of appointment and retention schemes, 
mechanisms for amending state constitutions are highly varied, and 
docket control is dramatically different among the states.  In other 
words, some state justices are especially vulnerable to democratic 
checks and others are protected from most types of political retalia-
tion. 
The balance of this Part will provide a quick tour of how state sys-
tems vary from each other, with particular emphasis on judicial elec-
tions.12  The ramifications of all this will be considered at the end of 
the Part.  In particular, we will explain why democratically accounta-
ble state justices have reason to take voter backlash into account on 
high-salience issues, why these same justices also need to reach out to 
campaign contributors, and why politically insulated justices can nev-
ertheless pursue significant social change through expansive inter-
pretations of state constitutional provisions. 
 
state courts that “draw heavily from federal justiciability principles” and those that “di-
verge from Article III doctrine by offering advisory opinions, resolving moot disputes, and 
deciding political questions”). 
 11 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL REVISITED 92–93 (2002) (“The Supreme Court’s rules and structures . . . give life-
tenured justices enormous latitude to reach decisions based on their personal policy pre-
ferences.”). 
 12 Some of the discussion in this Part is drawn from Devins, supra note 1, at 1640–52 (pro-
viding an overview of how states revise their constitutions, select and retain judges, and 
decide what stays on the docket). 
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A. State Constitutions and Their Amendability  
The first key feature that likely influences state supreme court ac-
countability is the state constitution.  State constitutions range in size 
from 8,000 words (similar to the size of the U.S. Constitution) to 
200,000 words.13  The states have had 145 constitutions,14 and the pro-
cedures for amending the states’ constitutions vary.15  All told, the fif-
ty state constitutions have been amended more than 7,400 times.16  In 
 
 13 Paul Brace & Kellie Sims Butler, New Perspectives for the Comparative Study of the Judiciary:  
The State Supreme Court Project, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 243, 244 (2001). 
 14 See Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism:  Toward a Theory of State Constitutional Mean-
ings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 888 (1999).  Louisiana has had the most constitutions in its his-
tory as a state, with a total of eleven.  JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS:  A JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 27 (2005).  Georgia 
has had ten constitutions, South Carolina, seven, and Alabama, Florida, and Virginia have 
each had six.  THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF STATES 12 tbl.1.1 (2009). 
 15 For example, twelve states require consideration of legislature-proposed constitutional 
amendments in two, separate sessions.  See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 14, 
at 14–15 tbl.1.2 (Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nevada, New York, Pennsylva-
nia, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin).  Another three states 
require some type of supermajority vote in one session or a majority vote in two successive 
legislative sessions (Connecticut, Hawaii, New Jersey).  Id.  In order to get an amendment 
on the ballot in Connecticut, it must get a three-fourths vote in each house of the legisla-
ture in one session or a majority vote in each house in two sessions between which an 
election has intervened.  Id.  Hawaii requires a two-thirds vote in each house in one ses-
sion or a majority vote in each house in two sessions.  Id.  New Jersey requires three-fifths 
of all members of each house at one session or a majority of all members of each house 
for two successive sessions.  Id.  When the constitutional amendment is voted on in the 
legislative sessions, seventeen states require only a majority vote of legislators for the 
amendment to be sent for ratification (Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin), nine states require a three-
fifths vote (Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
North Carolina, and Ohio), and eighteen states require a two-thirds vote (Alaska, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missis-
sippi, Montana, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming).  
Id. 
 The following states have slightly different requirements:  Oregon (majority vote to 
amend the constitution and two-thirds vote to revise it), South Carolina (two-thirds ma-
jority of members of each house for first passage, and majority of members of each house 
after popular ratification), Tennessee (majority of members elected to both houses for 
first passage, and two-thirds of members elected to both houses for second passage), and 
Vermont (two-thirds vote in the state Senate, majority vote in the state House for first 
passage, then a majority of both houses for second passage, but as of 1974, amendments 
may be submitted only every four years).  Id.  When the amendments go for voter ratifica-
tion, the vast majority of states simply require a majority vote of the electorate to pass the 
amendment.  Id. 
 16 THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 14, at 12 tbl.1.1.  Topping the list, Alabama’s 
constitution has been amended more than 800 times.  Id.  As another example, Califor-
nia’s constitution has been amended 518 times as of Jan. 1, 2009.  Id.; see also GARDNER, 
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comparison, “[o]f more than 5,000 proposed amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution, only seventeen have been approved since the Bill 
of Rights and only three amendments explicitly overruled decisions 
of the U.S. Supreme Court.”17 
Notably, in eighteen states, voters can make use of an initiative 
process to amend their state’s constitution.18  From 1898 to 1995, vot-
ers in seventeen states considered 732 constitutional amendment in-
itiatives, approving 223 of them.19  Of the 223 constitutional amend-
ment measures passed before 1995, twenty-one were ratified in the 
1970s, rising to thirty-three in the 1980s, and rising even further to 
fourty-two in the period from 1991 to 1995.20  Since the 1970s, “citi-
zens have used the initiative process more frequently and across a 
greater number of states than at any other time.”21  Initiative use in-
creased four-fold during this period; in the 1950s and 1960s, an aver-
age of four initiatives were passed each year; in the 1990s and 2000s, 
an average of seventeen initiatives have been enacted each year.22  
Voter initiatives have been used to create law on a broad range of 
topics including education, the environment, government reform, 
health, and family law.23 
B. Docket Control 
Docket control also likely influences state supreme court accoun-
tability to the voting public and campaign contributors.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has virtually total discretion in the cases it hears.  This 
is not so for most state supreme courts.  Six states have virtually no 
control over their dockets, six others have near total control, and the 
 
supra note 14, at 27 (noting that the South Carolina and Texas constitutions have been 
amended more than 400 times each). 
 17 Neal Devins, Same-Sex Marriage and the New Judicial Federalism: Why State Courts Should Not 
Consider Out-of-State Backlash in NEW FRONTIERS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DUAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF NORMS 81(James A. Gardner & Jim Rossi eds., 2010). 
 18 THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 14, at 16 tbl.1.3.  State practices vary consider-
ably. Some states have subject matter restrictions and supermajority voting requirements 
along with other procedural requirements that restrict the use of the initiative process.  
KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 36–37 (2009).  There is also 
significant variation among direct-democracy states concerning the procedures to get an 
initiative on the ballot.  See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 14, at 16 tbl.1.3. 
 19 See LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 235 (4th 
ed. 2006). 
 20 See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 19, at 235. 
 21 MILLER, supra note 18, at 46. 
 22 Id. at 42 fig.2.1. 
 23 MILLER, supra note 18, at 55–65. 
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remaining states span the space in between the two extremes.24  For 
example, most medium-sized and larger states have significant (but 
not plenary) control over which cases they will hear, while supreme 
courts in states without intermediate appellate courts have no choice 
but to hear appeals.25  Several states also require their supreme courts 
to hear all constitutional challenges to state law,26 and in ten states, 
the state supreme court may, and in certain circumstances must, give 
advisory opinions—a function completely forbidden for federal 
courts.27  State courts, moreover, frequently entertain “disputes be-
tween state or local officials when federal courts would dismiss com-
parable cases for lack of standing or ripeness.”28 
These and other limits on docket control mean that some state 
courts cannot make use of the “passive virtues” (certiorari denials, 
findings of no jurisdiction) to extricate themselves from politically 
complex cases.29  Initiatives, for example, are often subject to pre-
election review by the state courts, in some cases due to mandatory 
requirements of the state’s initiative process, and in other cases due 
to opponent challenges.30  Pre-election reviews mainly focus on pro-
cedural sufficiency, such as the number of required signatures, the 
title of the initiative, and its summary.31  Pre-election substantive chal-
lenges are significantly fewer, but “[i]n Arkansas, Oklahoma, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nebraska, and Utah, courts will consider facial con-
stitutional challenges to initiatives before the election, and, in 
Florida, the state constitution mandates this form of pre-election re-
view.”32 
 
 24 SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND ET AL., COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, STATE COURT CASELOAD 
STATISTICS 16–67 (2007), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_research/CSP/
2007_files/State%20Court%20Caseload%20Statistics%202007.pdf (providing graphical 
charts of each state’s court structure). 
 25 Robert A. Kagan et al., The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L. REV. 961, 984–85 
(1978). 
 26 See Devins, supra note 1, at 1650 (discussing state court practices and same-sex marriage 
litigation). 
 27 Brace & Butler, supra note 13, at 248 tbl.1. 
 28 Hans A. Linde, The State and the Federal Courts in Governance:  Vive La Différence!, 46 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1273, 1275 (2005) (internal quotations omitted). 
 29 For the classic defense of the “passive virtues,” see generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
 30 MILLER, supra note 18, at 98–99. 
 31 Id. at 99. 
 32 Id. 
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C. Judicial Selection and Retention 
State supreme court justices are selected and retained through va-
rying methods that put the justices in thirty-nine states before voters 
in partisan, non-partisan, and retention elections.33  In total, 89% of 
state supreme court justices face voters—“43 [%] face retention elec-
tions, 20[%] face nonpartisan elections, and 26[%] face partisan 
elections.”34 
Although there are numerous ways to categorize the method of 
selection and retention for state supreme court justices,35 we have or-
ganized states into four groups:  partisan election, nonpartisan elec-
tion, merit plan, and gubernatorial/legislative appointment.36  In 
states with gubernatorial or legislative appointment, the governor or 
legislature selects the justice, usually from a list of names provided by 
a nominating committee.  Non-partisan elections place judges on the 
ballot without a party label, whereas partisan elections require judges 
to run under a party label.  In merit plan states, judges are appointed 
by a merit selection board and face retention elections in which there 
are no opposing candidates; voters are simply asked to vote “yes” or 
“no” on whether to retain the judge.37  Table 1, below, lists the initial 
 
 33 David Rottman, Judicial Elections in 2008, in COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 14, at 
290. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. (claiming that due to the slight variations among the states’ selection and retention 
systems, there are sixteen distinct selection/retention schemes).  Most sources will group 
the states more generally into four or five schemes. 
 36 See infra Table 1.  Table 2, infra, is grouped into five categories:  partisan election, non-
partisan election, merit plan, gubernatorial/legislative appointment, and serve to age se-
venty/life.  The gubernatorial/legislative appointment category from Table 1 is divided 
into two categories for Table 2:  those states that require reappointment by governor or 
legislature and those for which once state supreme court justices are initially selected, 
they serve until age 70 or life terms, more akin to the federal bench.  Also, merit plan in 
Table 1 becomes retention election in Table 2, as merit plan states use retention elections 
for reappointment of their judges.  See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 37 Rottman, supra note 33, at 290.  Under the Missouri Plan, or merit selection, judges were 
selected by a judicial committee who evaluated the candidates and passed on names to 
the governor to choose an appointment.  See Malia Reddick, Merit Selection:  A Review of the 
Social Scientific Literature, 106 DICK. L. REV. 729, 729 (2002).  After serving a short period 
of time (almost like a probation period), the appointed judge’s name was placed on the 
election ballot in which voters were asked to vote “yes” or “no” on whether to retain the 
judge.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 139 (2009).  No other person ran 
against the judge, and the judge did not run under any partisan affiliation.  Reddick, su-
pra at 729.  If voters voted to retain the judge, the judge served a full term on the bench.  
Rottman, supra note 33, at 294–95 tbl.5.1.  At the end of the term, the judge again faced a 
retention election.  If approved, he or she served another term, but if not retained, the 
process started over again—the judicial committee would form and suggest candidates 
for the governor to appoint.  Current variations on the Missouri Plan model are numer-
ous. 
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selection method for each state’s supreme court justices.  Table 2 
provides a list of retention methods. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1: 
INITIAL SELECTION METHOD 
Partisan  
Election 
Non-partisan 
Election
Merit Plan Governor /  
Legislature 
Alabama 
Illinois 
Louisiana 
Pennsylvania 
Texas 
West Virginia 
Arkansas 
Georgia 
Idaho 
Kentucky 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Montana 
Nevada 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oregon 
Washington 
Wisconsin 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Colorado 
Florida 
Hawaii 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Maryland 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
Oklahoma 
South  
Dakota 
Utah 
Wyoming
California 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
New  
Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
Tennessee 
Vermont 
Virginia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
464 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:2 
 
TABLE 2: 
RETENTION METHOD 
 
 
Partisan  
Election 
Non-partisan 
Election 
Retention 
Election 
Governor/ 
Legislature 
Serve to 
Age 70 or 
Life 
Alabama 
Louisiana 
Texas 
West  
Virginia 
Arkansas 
Georgia 
Idaho 
Kentucky 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Montana 
Nevada 
North 
Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oregon 
Washington 
Wisconsin 
Alaska 
Arizona 
California 
Colorado 
Florida 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Maryland 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
New  
Mexico 
Oklahoma 
Pennsylva-
nia 
South  
Dakota 
Tennessee 
Utah 
Wyoming
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Hawaii 
Maine 
New York 
South  
Carolina 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Massachu-
setts 
New  
Hampshire 
New Jersey 
Rhode  
Island 
 
 
Before the late 1980s, judicial elections were seen as “‘low key af-
fairs, conducted with civility and dignity,’ which were ‘as exciting as a 
game of checkers. . . . [p]layed by mail.’”38  Today, judicial elections 
are more contested and competitive39 than ever, and money is playing 
 
 38 Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1589, 1602 (2009) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selec-
tion, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1079 (2007)). 
 39 See Brace & Butler, supra note 13, at 244 (“[J]udicial elections are more competitive than 
commonly believed.”).   
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an increasing role.40  Data shows that while only 33% of nonpartisan 
elections were contested in 1988, by 2000, 75% of nonpartisan elec-
tions were contested.41  Similarly, 74% of partisan elections were con-
tested in 1988, but by 2000, that number had risen to 95%.42  In con-
tested incumbent partisan and nonpartisan elections, incumbent 
judges seeking reelection have an 8.3% chance of losing, and an in-
cumbent in a partisan election has a substantially higher chance of 
losing than an incumbent in a nonpartisan election.43  In 2000, in-
cumbents in partisan elections were defeated in 45.5% of elections.44  
This rate of defeat is much higher than for incumbents running for 
reelection to the U.S. House, U.S. Senate, and state governorships.45  
In comparison to contested elections, however, retention elections 
see a far smaller percentage of losses because judges facing retention 
elections are unopposed.  Between 1990 and 2000, only 3 of 177 
(1.7%) state supreme court justices were defeated in retention elec-
tions,46 and 1964–2006 data suggests that judges in retention election 
states lose about 1% of the time.47  Finally, tenure data for appointed 
judges show these judges to be more secure in their positions than 
elected judges.48 
 
 40 See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Through the Lens of Diversity:  The Fight for Judicial Elections After Repub-
lican Party of Minnesota v. White, 10 Mich. J. Race & L. 55, 93 (2004). 
 41 See Shepherd, supra note 38, at 1602. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Chris W. Bonnaeu, Electoral Verdicts:  Incumbent Defeats in State Supreme Courts, 33 AM. POL. 
RES. 818, 834, 835 tbl.5 (2005). 
 44 Shepherd, supra note 38, at 1602–03. 
 45 See Richard B. Saphire & Paul Moke, The Ideologies of Judicial Selection:  Empiricism and the 
Transformation of the Judicial Selection Debate, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 551, 568 (2008); see also 
Shepherd, supra note 38, at 1603. 
 46 See Larry Aspin, Judicial Retention Election Trends 1964–2006, 90 JUDICATURE 208, 210 
(2007), available at http://www.ajs.org/ajs/publications/Judicature_PDFs/905/
aspin_905.pdf (containing a ten state survey of retention elections current up to 2006, 
showing that between 1964 and 2006, of the 6,306 judges in the ten states subject to re-
tention elections, only fifty-six judges lost their retention elections and fifty-one of the fif-
ty-six judges defeated were trial court judges; thus, only five of the judges who lost reten-
tion elections were on state appellate courts); Bonneau, supra note 43, at 825 (stating that 
approximately 1.7% of state supreme court justices lose retention elections—a number 
consistent with the 1% loss rate of all state court judges facing retention elections). 
 47 Id.  The loss rate of 1% was calculated by dividing the number of judges who lost reten-
tion elections by the total number of judges who faced retention elections in the Aspin 
study.  See id.  A total of fifty-six judges out of 6,306 lost retention elections, which is ap-
proximately 1%. 
 48 Tenure data grants credence to the notion that state supreme court justices have great 
incentive to be attuned to the public by revealing that “on average, reappointed judges 
serve 27 percent longer terms than reelected judges” and “reappointed judges are re-
tained at a higher rate than reelected judges.”  Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Reten-
tion Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 181–82 (2009). 
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Today, state supreme court elections—especially contested parti-
san and nonpartisan races—increasingly involve the mudslinging and 
attack ads common to other contested political races.49  Consider, for 
example, the 2008 Mississippi Supreme Court elections, where four 
justices faced contested nonpartisan reelection bids.  Mud came from 
challengers, incumbents, and third parties alike.  Justice Easley ac-
cused his challenger of being a “deadbeat dad,”50 and Justice Oliver 
Diaz, Jr. was the focus of third-party attack ads alleging he voted “for 
baby killers, and the murderer of an elderly woman.”51  In the end, 
three of four high court justices would lose their seats to challengers, 
including the Chief Justice.52  All told, nearly three million dollars 
were spent on just these four Mississippi Supreme Court races.53 
The Mississippi case does not stand alone.  Candidates and inter-
est groups increasingly espouse their beliefs on contested issues.54  
Here are two more examples of this phenomenon:  a 2006 Washing-
ton ad focused on the candidate and “far right extremists” “so ex-
treme they want to gut protections for our clean air and water.  They 
oppose stem cell research and a woman’s right to choose.”55  Also in 
2006, Alabama’s Chief Justice Drayton Nabers was attacked for allow-
ing a convicted murderer off death row because of “Foreign Law 
[and] unratified UN Treaties.”56 
The nastiness of today’s races as well as dramatic increases in the 
number of contested races is tied to several factors.  Judicial decision 
making is more salient today than ever before, especially considering 
the declining docket of the U.S. Supreme Court and the increasing 
deference the Court gives to state decision making.57  More than that, 
 
 49 See David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 307 (2008). 
 50 Raheem Dawodu, In Mississippi, Three Justices Sent Packing, GAVEL GRAB (Nov. 6, 2008), 
http://www.gavelgrab.org/?p=697. 
 51 Don Culpepper, Supreme Court Candidates React to Third Party Negative Ads, WLOX (Oct. 30, 
2008), http://www.wlox.com/Global/story.asp?S=9269467&nav=menu40_2. 
 52 See Dawodu, supra note 50. 
 53 Nat’l Inst. on Money in State Politics, National Overview Map (2008), FOLLOWTHEMONEY 
(May 28, 2010), http://www.followthemoney.org/database/nationalview.phtml?l=0&f=
J&y=2008&abbr=0 [hereinafter FOLLOWTHEMONEY 2008] (comparing contributions to 
high court candidates’ campaigns by dollar amount and state for 2008). 
 54 See Pozen, supra note 49, at 300–01 (“Judicial candidates increasingly invoke their beliefs 
on abortion, same-sex marriage, tort reform, and other controversial issues; if they do not 
do so, interest groups may try to ferret them out through questionnaires.”). 
 55 FairCourtsPage, 2000–2006 Selected State Supreme Court Ads, YOUTUBE (Feb. 20, 2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MbdBM_XCyvc&feature=related. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See Devins, supra note 1, at 1635–39 (discussing the increase in state supreme court deci-
sions which involve constitutional issues, the deference the U.S. Supreme Court gives 
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a 2002 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White, invalidated on First Amendment grounds a law that prohibited 
judicial candidates from taking positions on issues that might come 
before them.58  Finally, and perhaps most significantly, there has been 
a dramatic infusion of money into judicial campaigns—so much so 
that state supreme court justices are under increasing pressure to 
raise significant funds for reelection.59 
The correlation between the highest fundraiser in judicial cam-
paigns for state high courts and the winner of the election “has ex-
ceeded 80 percent” since 2000.60  From 2000 through 2009, $206.4 
million was raised for judicial campaigns.61  This is almost two and 
one-half times the amount raised for state supreme court campaigns 
the previous decade (which was $83.3 million from 1990–1999).62  Al-
though most judicial campaigns did not reach the millions until 
2000, when candidates and third parties spent over $45 million on 
 
such decisions, and the resulting disparity between the U.S. Supreme Court and state su-
preme court decisions which concern issues of constitutional law). 
 58 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002). 
 59 For these very reasons, efforts at reforming or ridding states of judicial elections have re-
cently been attempted or passed in a few states through both ballot initiatives and legisla-
tive action.  See Fredreka Schouten, States Act to Revise Judicial Selection:  Influence Worries 
Rise as Money Floods Races, USA TODAY, Mar. 31, 2010, at 1A.  West Virginia and Wisconsin 
have adopted public financing systems for judicial elections since December of 2009.  Id.  
Minnesota had a bill before the legislature that would allow voters to amend the state 
constitution to ban competitive elections and replace them with gubernatorial appoint-
ment and merit retention elections.  Id.  Nevada has a constitutional ballot initiative 
going before voters in November to permit gubernatorial appointment of judges.  Id.  Fi-
nally, Michigan’s Supreme Court adopted rules in November that permit the court to de-
cide if a member should recuse himself or herself due to a potential conflict of interest.  
Id. 
 Additionally, former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has made it 
her personal cause to abolish judicial elections.  See Sandra Day O’Connor, Op-Ed., Take 
Justice off the Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2010, at WK9.  Recently, she became Chairwoman 
of the newly created O’Connor Judicial Selection Initiative, sponsored by the Institute for 
the Advancement of the American Legal System at the University of Denver, which will 
“encourag[e] state initiatives to scrap direct judicial elections.”  John Schwartz, Effort Be-
gun to Abolish the Election of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at A12; see also O’Connor 
Judicial Selection Initiative, Genesis of the Initiative, INST. ADVANCEMENT AM. LEGAL SYS., 
http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/judicial_selection.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).  
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, too, has voiced her belief that states should abandon judi-
cial elections, stating in March of 2010, “If there’s a reform I would make, it would be 
that.”  Robert Barnes, Ginsburg Would Forbid Judicial Elections, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2010, 
at A2. 
 60 JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS 2006 20 (2006), http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/NewPolitic
sofJudicialElections2006_D2A2449B77CDA.pdf. 
 61 Schouten, supra note 59. 
 62 Id. 
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state supreme court judicial elections,63 some races reached into the 
millions as early as 1986.64  Graph 1 below shows the overall trend of 
state supreme court election spending for the past two decades.65   
GRAPH 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite some variance, the trend is clearly toward increased 
spending.  Pro-business interest groups are at the center of the 
change in the nature of state supreme court elections; they now ac-
count for approximately 44% of all fundraising and 90% of special 
 
 63 Nat’l Inst. on Money in State Politics, National Overview Map (2000), FOLLOWTHEMONEY, 
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/nationalview.phtml?l=0&f=J&y=2000&abbr=0 
(last visited Nov.14, 2010) [hereinafter FOLLOWTHEMONEY 2000] (comparing contribu-
tions to high court candidates’ campaigns by dollar amount and state for 2000). 
 64 The 1986 retention election of California Supreme Court Justices Cruz Reynoso, Joseph 
Grodin, and Chief Justice Rose Bird was a contentious battle in which Bird, Grodin, and 
Reynoso spent $4.5 million while the campaign against them spent over $7 million.  See 
Miller, supra note 18, at 212–13 (discussing the ouster of three California Supreme Court 
justices in a retention election due to continuous reversal of death sentences in death 
penalty appeals).  Pennsylvania experienced a high-court million-dollar election as early 
as 1989.  Campaign Contributors and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 1 
(2010), http://www.ajs.org/selection/jnc/docs/AJS-PAstudy3-18-10.pdf (noting that the 
two candidates raised $2.5 million in the single 1989 Supreme Court race in Pennsylva-
nia, a state in which justices are initially elected in partisan elections). 
 65 Graph 1 is based on data for even-year elections.  The vast majority of states with judicial 
elections hold them in even years, while only Pennsylvania and Wisconsin consistently 
hold odd-year elections.  All data for the graph was obtained from the National Institute 
on Money in State Politics website, http://www.followthemoney.org. 
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interest television advertising.66  For example, in 2005 and 2006, 44% 
of campaign donations came from business interests, while 21% came 
from lawyers.67 
Expenditures have been almost entirely in the fourteen states with 
partisan and nonpartisan state supreme court elections.68  This is 
hardly surprising; justices in the twenty-four states with retention elec-
tions win around 99% of the time, and, consequently, there are rela-
tively few issues of sufficient salience to pose electoral risks to these 
justices.69  For this reason, the pressure to seek out campaign contri-
butions is very much tied to the retention system employed.  We will 
now consider how these state-to-state differences might affect justices 
and, more generally, the potential pressure justices feel to take into 
account the views of either voters or campaign contributors. 
D. Ramifications 
To start, state supreme court justices, “like all policymakers in a 
democracy, . . . must retain their posts in order to achieve their policy 
goals.”70  In the thirty-eight states where justices stand for some type 
of reelection, “[t]he institutional design creates a direct incentive for 
judges to consider public opinion in rendering their decisions.”71  
State supreme court justices are not passive, disconnected actors 
when it comes to elections; like any politician, they are motivated and 
 
 66 SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 60, at 7, 18 (explaining percent contribution to negative ads 
and percent contribution to overall fundraising).  For additional discussion of interest 
group influences, see Clive S. Thomas et al., Interest Groups and State Court Elections:  A New 
Era and Its Challenges, 87 JUDICATURE 135 (2003). 
 67 Ifill, supra note 40, at 93–94 (noting how judicial campaign expenditures have “skyrock-
et[ed]” and are “the most accurate predictor of the outcome of supreme court judicial 
races”); SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 60, at 18 (breaking down the contributions to state su-
preme court candidates’ 2005–2006 campaigns by donor type); see also Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2264–65 (2009) (overturning the affirmation of a $50 
million jury verdict where one of three affirming judges had been elected as the result of 
a $3 million dollar campaign contribution from the CEO of the defendant corporation). 
 68 See FOLLOWTHEMONEY 2008, supra note 53, (comparing contributions to high court can-
didates’ campaigns by dollar amount and state for 2008); FOLLOWTHEMONEY 2000, supra 
note 63 (comparing contributions to high court candidates’ campaigns by dollar amount 
and state for 2000). 
 69 See infra notes 117 30 and accompanying text (discussing studies of judicial votes in death 
penalty cases and noting how death penalty decisions of justices are among the few issues 
highly salient to the public). 
 70 Elisha Carol Savchak & A.J. Barghothi, The Influence of Appointment and Retention Consti-
tuencies:  Testing Strategies of Judicial Decisionmaking, 7 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 394, 396 (2007). 
 71 Bradley W. Joondeph, The Many Meanings of “Politics” in Judicial Decision Making, 77 UMKC 
L. REV. 347, 365 (2008). 
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willing to exert great effort to maintain their seats.72  Needless to say, 
electoral pressures are especially strong in the fourteen states with 
contested elections.  In these states, justices have a strong incentive to 
follow public opinion on politically salient issues.73  More generally, 
these justices are likely to steer clear of political controversy.74 
In states that make use of retention elections (where sitting justic-
es almost always win), there are fewer electoral risks.  At the same 
time, these justices may well take public opinion into account—at 
least with respect to a handful of highly salient issues.75  After all, pub-
lic officials in electoral settings, even those with safe seats, often fear 
electoral defeat.76  State supreme court justices are no exception.  For 
justices subject to reappointment, public opinion is less salient; what 
would matter is their relationship with the branch responsible for 
their reappointment.77 
 
 72 See Savchak & Barghothi, supra note 70, at 396 (stating that “[b]ecause most state su-
preme court judges are at the pinnacle of their legal careers in terms of prestige and their 
substantial ability to shape policy, they are likely motivated to please their retention con-
stituencies”). 
 73 High-salience issues include abortion, the death penalty, search and seizure, victims’ 
rights, tort reform, and gay rights.  All of these issues have figured in efforts to unseat sit-
ting justices in contested judicial elections.  See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elec-
tions Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 49–50 (2003) (noting various nationwide judicial races 
where interest groups opposed judges’ reelection campaigns by calling attention to their 
previous opinions on controversial matters). 
 74 Docket control limits, however, may make it impossible to deny certiorari or otherwise 
avoid a politically divisive issue.  See supra notes 24–31 and accompanying text. 
 75 See infra notes 125–30 and accompanying text (discussing examples—most notably, the 
death penalty—of Justices losing their seats in retention elections).  In 2010, three Iowa 
Supreme Court Justices lost retention bids, presumably because they voted to overturn 
the state ban on same-sex marriage.  See A.G. Sulzberger, In Iowa, Voters Oust Judges Over 
Marriage Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/11/03/us/politics/03judges.html.  For reasons discussed infra note 141 and ac-
companying text, these Justices took electoral risks by bucking public opinion on same 
sex marriage. 
 76 This is one of the foundational assumptions of political scientists who study congressional 
motivations.  See generally MORRIS P. FIORINA, REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS, AND 
CONSTITUENCIES (1974) (evaluating candidates’ behavior in various constituency condi-
tions in light of their motivation to seek reelection); JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN’S 
VOTING DECISIONS (2d ed. 1981) (studying how members of the House of Representatives 
make voting decisions).  On the issue of why lawmakers—even in safe districts—
increasingly focus their attention on reelection concerns, see Neal Devins, The Academic 
Expert Before Congress:  Observations and Lessons From Bill Van Alstyne’s Testimony, 54 DUKE 
L.J. 1525, 1538–39 (2005) (discussing how the growing partisanship of elections results in 
campaigning lawmakers spending less time legislating and more time dealing with reelec-
tion and constituents). 
 77 See Shepherd, supra note 38, at 1607–08 (“The power over judicial retention held by the 
governor or legislature offers the political branches of government direct opportunities 
to sanction judges for unpopular rulings.  Judges who consistently vote against the inter-
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In addition to retention risks, state justices might take public opi-
nion into account if they thought there was a link between public 
opinion and the possible nullification of their decisions through con-
stitutional amendments or, alternatively, perceived that elected offi-
cials would be unwilling to implement a decision of which the public 
disapproves.78  For example, justices might be more attentive to pub-
lic opinion in states with direct democracy initiatives than in states 
with hard-to-amend constitutions. 
In the fourteen states with contested judicial elections, moreover, 
justices must also take account of the views of campaign contributors 
and party leaders (at least in the four states that make use of partisan 
election schemes).79  On issues where these contributors have an eco-
nomic stake, for example, state justices would have incentive to act in 
ways that do not disappoint contributors.  This is especially true of is-
sues that are of low political salience.  Voters are not likely to know or 
care about these issues.80 
Against this backdrop, one would expect significant variations 
among state justices.  On socially divisive issues, politically insulated 
justices would be more apt to be legal policy entrepreneurs than jus-
tices who run substantial risks of either losing reelection or having 
their decisions overturned by a constitutional amendment or legisla-
tion.  In other words, justices subject to significant voter and lawmak-
er checks would likely embrace politically popular positions or, alter-
natively, steer clear of divisive issues (assuming docket control).  
Moreover, justices in states with contested elections would likely take 
into account the views of campaign contributors—especially on low-
salience issues. 
Part III of this paper will discuss the evidence we have gathered 
about state practices and, in so doing, provide support for the above 
 
ests of the other branches of government may hurt their chances for reappointment.”).  
For further discussion, see infra note 124. 
 78 All political science models assume that the primary motivation of U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices is the advancement of their preferred legal policy vision.  Consequently, political 
scientists who think that the Court is vulnerable to electoral backlash argue that the Jus-
tices will act strategically by taking the risk of political reprisal into account.  See Fried-
man, supra note 4, at 370–74](discussing instances where the Court backed public opi-
nion because of actual or anticipated electoral backlash).  See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK 
KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) (arguing that U.S. Supreme Court Justices 
take numerous factors into account in deciding cases). 
 79 In addition to these four states (Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, West Virginia), two other 
states (Michigan, Ohio) make use of electoral systems in which party officials play a prom-
inent role.  Interview with David Rottman, Principal Court Research Consultant, Nat’l 
Ctr. for State Courts (Mar. 30, 2010). 
 80 For additional discussion, see infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
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claims.  Before turning to this evidence, Part II will provide additional 
details about the capacity of state justices to assess the risks of voter or 
lawmaker reprisals and, more generally, how the legal policy prefe-
rences of state justices are often linked to the degree of democratic 
accountability in their state’s judicial system. 
II.  STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AND THEIR AUDIENCES81 
By highlighting differences among state constitutional systems, 
Part I suggested that justices subject to democratic controls (especial-
ly justices in states with contested elections) are more likely to take 
voter attitudes into account than are politically insulated justices.  
This section will extend this point in two ways.  First, by making use of 
social psychology, we will argue that justices who run for election, es-
pecially contested elections, are more likely to care about their repu-
tations among the mass public than are politically insulated justices.  
Second, by looking at state justices’ knowledge of in-state political 
conditions, we will argue that state justices subject to democratic con-
trols are more likely to understand the political ramifications of their 
decisions.  At the same time, because voters are generally unaware of 
state supreme court decision making, the risks of being voted out of 
office or having a decision negated by voter attitudes are generally 
limited to a small number of politically salient cases. 
A. Social Psychology, the Mass Public, and Judicial Attitudes Towards Public 
Opinion.   
In understanding judicial motivation, the dominant political 
science models focus on the U.S. Supreme Court and assume that 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices are interested in making good law, good 
policy, or some combination of the two.82  Some political scientists ar-
gue that the Justices need not take public opinion into account, 
pointing both to life tenure and the numerous roadblocks that stand 
in the way of elected government reprisals.83  Others, however, claim 
that the Justices—lacking the powers of purse and sword—are deeply 
concerned with their legitimacy and, with it, the willingness of other 
parts of government to implement their decisions.  As a result, the 
 
 81 The title of this section plays off of LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES:  A 
PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006). 
 82 See Baum & Devins, supra note 3, at 1529–32 (“Whether they seek to make good law, good 
policy, or some combination of the two, [political science] scholars think that Justices de-
vote themselves to those ends.”). 
 83 See generally SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 44. 
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Justices will take care not to issue decisions that significantly diverge 
from public opinion.84 
This divide among political scientists largely washes away when 
transported to the state supreme court context.  Most state justices 
stand for reelection and many state constitutions are easy to amend.  
In other words, for reasons noted in Part I, most state justices will 
have strong incentives to take voter attitudes into account (although 
there will be significant variance, depending on the type of reelection 
scheme and the availability of other democratic checks on judicial 
decision making). 
Separate from the risk of political reprisal, to what extent, if at all, 
do justices care about the esteem of the voting public and other 
groups, most notably, social and political elites?  Social psychology 
theory emphasizes the basic human desire to be liked and respected, 
suggesting that justices—in addition to pursuing favored legal poli-
cies—will also take into account their relationships with other justices 
as well as power, prestige, reputation, self-respect, and the satisfaction 
that people seek in a job.85  In particular, social psychology calls atten-
tion to the fact that people want most to be liked and respected by 
those to whom they are personally close and to people with whom 
they identify.  For justices on politically insulated courts, like the U.S. 
Supreme Court and a handful of state courts, social psychology sug-
gests that these justices will be especially interested in winning favor 
with elites, including bar groups, legal academics, and journalists.  
Empirical evidence supports this claim (at least with respect to politi-
cally insulated U.S. Supreme Court Justices):  U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices are political and social elites who travel in social and profes-
sional networks dominated by elites and, consequently, care more 
about elite attitudes than the views of the mass public.86 
What, then, of state justices who must seek reelection, especially 
justices in the fourteen states that have contested elections?  “On av-
erage,” as Larry Baum notes, “lawyers who are willing to face the elec-
 
 84 See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 78, at 157–59 (“Because they operate within the greater 
social and political context of the society as a whole, the justices also must attend to those 
informal rules that reflect dominant societal beliefs about the rule of law in general and 
the role of the Supreme Court in particular—the norms of legitimacy.”); Barry Friedman, 
Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2606–07 (2003) (asserting that 
judicial decision making is often consistent with popular opinion). 
 85 This proposition and much of this paragraph is drawn from Baum & Devins, supra note 3, 
at 1537. 
 86 See Baum & Devins, supra note 3, at 1546–79.  No scholar, to the best of our knowledge, 
has yet to examine the question of whether state justices on politically insulated courts 
are more interested in the views of elites than the views of the general public. 
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torate as judicial candidates have a relatively strong interest in the es-
teem of the mass public.”87  Through formal and informal campaign-
ing, these justices have significant contact with the electorate, contact 
that strengthens their “sense of links with the public” and, in turn, 
strengthens their desire to be validated by the public through a suc-
cessful reelection bid.88 
Empirical evidence backs up the social psychology model—at least 
with respect to the idea that judges who are subject to contested elec-
tions look and act “more like politicians and less like [politically dis-
interested] professionals.”89  These justices “are more likely to have 
gone to a lower-rank law school.  They are . . . more politically in-
volved, more locally connected, more temporary, and less well edu-
cated than appointed judges.”90 
 
 87 BAUM, supra note 84, at 62. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians:  The Uncertain 
Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 290, 327 
(2008). 
 90 Id. (evaluating state supreme court judges in 1998, 1999, and 2000 and noting that 70% 
of state supreme court judges in partisan election states attended an in-state law school 
with an average US News ranking of 57.9; in contrast, only 33% of appointed state su-
preme court judges attended in-state law schools, and the schools that they attended had 
an average ranking of 32.3).  This observation is bolstered by the cross-over among the 
branches at the state level—that is, judges who were former politicians or prosecutors.  See 
Chris W. Bonneau, The Composition of State Supreme Courts 2000, 85 JUDICATURE 26, 28 tbl.1 
(2001) (illustrating the background characteristics of state supreme court justices).  Parti-
san and nonpartisan election states boast more judges with prior prosecutorial expe-
rience and prior political electoral experience.  Id. at 30 tbl.2. 
 Analyzing data about all state supreme court justices on the bench in 2000, in the six 
states with initial selection partisan judicial elections, all six states had high courts with at 
least one-third of its members having prior prosecutorial experience, and four of six 
states had benches with at least 50% of its members with prior prosecutorial experience.  
Id.  Nonpartisan election states boasted fourteen of fifteen states with at least one su-
preme court judge with prior electoral experience, nine states with three or more judges 
with such experience, and four states with at least half of its court members with prior 
electoral experience.  Id.  Prosecutorial experience gives a judge or judicial candidate 
great name recognition in his race for office.  As expected, merit plan states and guber-
natorial/legislative selection states see fewer judges with prosecutorial experience.  The 
fifteen merit plan states included thirteen states with at least one member with prior ex-
perience, but only four states with at least three members with prior electoral experience.  
Id.  The drop off was even greater in gubernatorial/legislative appointment states, where 
eleven of fourteen states had at least one member, but only one state (Massachusetts) 
had three or more (and it was three) justices with prior electoral experience.  Id.  (The 
data was calculated by using Table 2 in the Bonneau piece and cross-referencing that 
with the number of justices on each state supreme court.  For example, if there are nine 
justices on the state high court, and the percentage of justices on that court who have 
prior prosecutorial experience is 33% in the Bonneau table, then that means three jus-
tices have prosecutorial experience.) 
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Comparatively, individuals who run in judicial elections have dif-
ferent personality types than those individuals who are appointed to 
the bench.  Like other politicians, justices in the fourteen states with 
contested elections are likely to have a strong “interest in popularity 
as an end in itself.”91  In other states, justices are less likely to value 
the esteem of the voting public.  This is especially true of justices who 
are not subject to reelection or reappointment.  In other words, as 
suggested in Part I, there will be significant variation among state su-
preme court justices in their attitudes towards the voting public and, 
more generally, public opinion. 
B. Judicial Capacity, Voter Knowledge, and the Incentives to Take Account of 
Public Opinion. 
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, where assessments of backlash 
risks are often a “shot in the dark,”92 state justices (in states with con-
tested elections) are well versed in state politics because of their di-
rect connections to political parties, voters, campaign contributors, 
and interest groups.93  Yet, even in states without contested elections, 
state justices typically know a great deal about state politics.  Most 
state supreme courts, as discussed in Part I, are subject to significant 
democratic checks (and sometimes cannot steer clear of political 
 
 Courts with justices with prior electoral experience are even more telling as to the 
type of person who runs in a judicial election.  In legislative and gubernatorial election 
states, six of fourteen courts had at least one member with prior electoral experience, 
and four of those six had only one member with electoral experience.  Id.  Interestingly, 
South Carolina boasted a court with 100% of justices having prior electoral experience.  
Id.  In South Carolina, state supreme court justices are selected by the legislature.  Per-
haps the legislature was selecting from its own members.  Merit plan states had only three 
state high courts with justices with prior electoral experience:  Kansas (one), Missouri 
(two), and Utah (one).  Id.; see THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 14, at 294 
tbl.5.1 (listing the number of justices on each high court).  In contrast, twelve of fifteen 
nonpartisan judicial election states had at least one member with electoral experience, 
and five, or one-third, of states had three or more such members.  Bonneau, supra, at 28 
tbl.1.  In Mississippi and Nevada, more than half of the courts’ members had prior elec-
toral experience.  Id.  Similarly, five of six partisan election states had at least one mem-
ber with prior electoral experience.  Id.  Alabama’s Supreme Court had four of its nine 
members with prior electoral experience, which perhaps better explains their conten-
tious and antagonistic elections—the judges are used to that type of election from their 
political days.  Id. 
 91 See BAUM, supra note 81, at 62. 
 92 Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 155, 176 (2007). 
 93 See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text; infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text.  
Correspondingly, many of these justices formerly served as elected officials and have 
longstanding ties to state voters and the state’s political establishment.  See supra note 90; 
infra notes 95–99. 
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controversy because of limits on their docket control).  In direct de-
mocracy states, for example, state justices may render advisory opi-
nions about the legality of initiatives, decide legal challenges to initia-
tives, and sometimes have their handiwork overturned by initiatives.94 
More generally, “state judges are systematically exposed to and 
experienced in the legal institutions of their states,” they “spend their 
professional lives dealing with state legislation and administrative 
regulation,” and “[t]hey are much more likely than are their federal 
counterparts to know or be able to learn readily what is out there, 
how it came to be, and how well or badly it works.”95  State supreme 
court justices echo this sentiment, noting that “state courts are closer 
to politics than their federal colleagues, whether . . . elected or ap-
pointed”96 and are “generally closer to the public, to the legal institu-
tions and environments within the state, and to the public policy 
process.”97  A state supreme court justice is almost certainly a long-
time resident of her state, presumably reads state newspapers, likely 
sits and lives in the state capitol, has professional and social interac-
tions with state officials, hears about state officials, hears about 
goings-on from numerous sources, and is generally well-informed 
with respect to the in-state political climate.98  As of 2000, 65.7% of 
state supreme court justices were born in the state in which they 
serve, and 60.5% received their law degrees from a school in that 
state.99 
Needless to say, there is tremendous variation among state justic-
es’ knowledge of and interest in state politics and voter opinion.  
More than that, the incentive of state justices to take account of voter 
attitudes is tied to voter awareness of state court decision making.  On 
a handful of high-salience issues, as we will discuss in Part III, justices 
subject to election—even retention elections—have incentive to take 
public opinion into account.  As a prime example, justices have lost 
retention bids because of perceived resistance to the death penalty.100 
 
 94 See MILLER, supra note 18, at 101–22. 
 95 Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword:  State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norm and 
Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 976 (1985). 
 96 Linde, supra note 28, at 1286. 
 97 Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions:  The Limits of Federal Rationality Re-
view, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1168 (1999) (quoting Judith S. Kaye, Contributions of State 
Constitutional Law to the Third Century of American Federalism, 13 VT. L. REV. 49, 56 (1988)). 
 98 See Hans A. Linde, Observations of a State Court Judge, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS:  TOWARD 
INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 117 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988). 
 99 Bonneau, supra note 90, at 28. 
100 See infra notes 128–30 and accompanying text. 
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Outside of criminal justice, abortion, same-sex marriage, and a 
few other issues, there is little reason to think that the public is aware 
of state supreme court decision making.  There is extremely limited 
newspaper coverage of state court decision making and, as we will 
discuss in Part III, there are next to no opinion polls about either 
state court decisions or the issues before state supreme courts.101  In-
deed, the public is generally unaware of judicial decision making.102  
This is especially true of business issues, as public awareness is largely 
limited to divisive social issues.103 
C. Summary   
Most state supreme court justices have the incentive and capacity 
to take into account potential voter backlash (whether it be electoral 
defeat, direct democracy override, or voter approval of a constitu-
tional amendment proposal).  There are, however, a limited number 
of high-salience issues likely to trigger such a backlash.  Nevertheless, 
justices subject to some form of reelection are likely to be risk averse 
and, consequently, will steer clear of issues that arguably run reelec-
tion risks.  This is especially true for justices in states that make use of 
contested elections.  These elections are more contested than ever 
before, including significant expenditures on negative campaign ads. 
In addition to electoral risks, some state justices are likely to care 
about public opinion because they have strong personal interests in 
the esteem of the mass public.  This is especially true of justices who 
participate in contested races.  Many of these justices previously 
served as elected officials and are strongly interested in strengthening 
their links with the public.  On the other hand, justices appointed 
through a judicial commission or some other merit plan are more 
likely to identify with lawyer groups, judges, and other elites.  Like-
wise, justices who are not subject to reappointment (because they 
serve until they are seventy or have life tenure) are more likely to 
identify with elites than with the mass public. 
Variations in state systems suggest that politically insulated justices 
will be less interested in public opinion than elite opinion and more 
willing to play a path-breaking role on socially divisive issues.  For ex-
ample, justices in states with hard-to-amend constitutions are more 
 
101 See infra note 104. 
102 For example, the great majority of U.S. Supreme Court decisions receive little attention 
in the mass media and are unknown to the mass public.  For a summary of this data, see 
Friedman, supra note 84, at 2620–23.  See also Baum & Devins, supra note 3, at 1548–51. 
103 See Baum & Devins, supra note 3, at 1549–50. 
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likely to play a leadership role on social issues than justices subject to 
direct-democracy initiatives.  At the other extreme, justices subject to 
contested elections will be both sensitive to public opinion and risk 
averse, especially with respect to high-salience issues.  These justices, 
moreover, are under increasing pressure to raise campaign contribu-
tions and, consequently, are likely to take into account the views of 
business constituencies—especially on low-salience economic issues.  
Justices subject to retention election (where justices win 99% of the 
time) will pay limited attention to public opinion.  On the death pe-
nalty, abortion, and other issues where there is some risk of voter re-
taliation, justices subject to retention election are likely to be atten-
tive to public opinion.  On most issues, however, these justices are not 
likely to pay much attention to public opinion, especially if they were 
appointed under a merit plan (so that they will personally identify 
with lawyer groups and other judges).  Finally, justices subject to gu-
bernatorial or legislative reappointment are likely to pay attention to 
the policy preferences of the reappointing body—something that will 
likely but not necessarily track public opinion. 
In the next Part, we will test these claims by looking at existing 
empirical evidence (including evidence we collected for this paper) 
about the sensitivity of state supreme court justices to public opinion.  
We will consider the import of differences in state systems, the sa-
lience of the issue, and the role of campaign contributors and other 
economic interests.  As we will now explain, the evidence matches our 
claims (but is far too limited to be seen as definitive in any way). 
III.  ANALYZING THE EVIDENCE 
In Parts I and II, we suggested the following:  (1) Public opinion 
will matter to some but not all justices.  In states with contested elec-
tions, justices will follow the public’s lead on high-salience issues.  In 
states with retention elections, public opinion will be of limited relev-
ance.  In states where justices are subject to reappointment, the opi-
nion of the reappointing body—not public opinion—will matter.  
Likewise, public opinion will play a role in states where justices are 
not subject to reappointment.  (2) In states with contested elections, 
justices need to raise significant funds and are otherwise vulnerable 
to privately funded negative advertising.  Consequently, the views of 
campaign contributors and other economic interests are likely to in-
fluence judicial behavior in these states.  This is especially true on 
low-salience issues.  (3) States subject to significant democratic checks 
are not likely to make path-breaking decisions on divisive social is-
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sues; justices in politically insulated states are more likely to issue 
pathbreaking decisions. 
We will now examine each of these propositions in this Part.  In 
part, we will make use of existing studies.  In part, we will supplement 
these studies by seeking to match public opinion poll data with state 
supreme court decision making on a few high-salience issues.  Before 
turning to our findings, a few words about the state of the literature 
and the limitations of our study are in order.  To start, little data ex-
ists regarding state public opinion of state supreme courts, issues, or 
decisions, or the effects of public opinion on state supreme courts.104  
The research that has been done largely focuses on criminal law, es-
pecially capital punishment.105  Research has also been done on 
whether state supreme courts favor business interests, especially the 
linkage between campaign contributions and state supreme court de-
cision making.106  Finally, there is some research on whether path-
 
104 Public opinion research has largely focused on the U.S. Supreme Court.  Other papers in 
this symposium highlight some of this research as do Friedman, supra note 4, and PUBLIC 
OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. 
Egan eds., 2008).  This is not to say that no efforts have been made to gather data about 
state courts in general or state supreme courts in particular.  The largest state supreme 
court data collection undertaking—the State Supreme Court Data Project—headed by 
Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall, gathered the state supreme court decisions of all fifty 
states during court sessions from 1995 through 1998, as well as the biographical data of 
all justices who were on the bench during that period.  See State Supreme Court Data 
Project, Project Overview, RICE U., http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~pbrace/statecourt/ (last vi-
sited Nov. 14, 2010).  This database has allowed for a great deal of research on state su-
preme courts; however, at this point the data set is twelve years old and thus dated.  Other 
studies have gathered data on specific state supreme courts or specific issues and are thus 
more targeted and limited.  See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors 
a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at A1 (focusing on the Ohio Supreme 
Court and the effect of justices accepting campaign contributions from parties before the 
court or groups filing supporting briefs). 
 Data collection on fifty state supreme courts is clearly a massive undertaking, but like-
ly a necessary one to gain further insight on state supreme court decision making, partic-
ularly the influence of public opinion on decision making (not to mention the need for 
public opinion surveys and data collection related to state supreme court issues and rul-
ings).  Given that most law and most constitutional decisions are made at the state level, 
the data void is particularly unfortunate.  The limitations on this preliminary analysis are 
numerous, but cannot be helped given the unavailability of data. 
105 See infra notes 125–28 and accompanying text (discussing some of this research).  In ex-
plaining their focus on death cases, researchers have noted the availability of data on 
public opinion about the death penalty and, consequently, that it is the “most reasonable 
place to look for linkage.”  Paul Brace & Brent Boyea, State Supreme Court Decision-Making:  
A Re-Evaluation of the Electoral Connection 6 (2004) (presented at the 2004 annual meeting 
of the American Political Science Association) (on file with authors). 
106 See infra notes 144–60 and accompanying text. 
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breaking state supreme courts are politically insulated107 and on the 
propensity of justices subject to gubernatorial or legislative reap-
pointment to back up the policy views of the reappointing body.108 
One aim of this paper is to start to fill a gap in the currently avail-
able research, looking at the potential linkage between state supreme 
court decision making and public opinion on high-salience issues 
outside criminal justice.  We focused on a few high-salience issues 
that were likely to have both public opinion polls and state supreme 
court cases on point. 
A. Methodology  
First we searched for available public opinion polls for states, di-
viding them into groups by retention election method.  We searched 
for public opinion on abortion, education (particularly school fund-
ing), gay marriage/civil unions, eminent domain, medical marijuana, 
gun control, and immigration.109  Then, using keyword searches in 
Westlaw and Lexis Nexis state supreme court databases and state 
news databases, we searched for state supreme court cases on these 
topics.  Cases were matched to public opinion only if the issue of the 
case and the topic of the public opinion were sufficiently correlated, 
meaning of or relating to the same topic or sufficiently close that a 
reasonable inference could logically relate the case to the public opi-
nion.  This was done for each grouping of states such that searches 
were performed on virtually all states within each group.  This admit-
tedly unscientific approach, which represents just the first step in ga-
thering data given limited resources and time, was performed with  
sufficient scope to cover nearly every state such that basic conclusions 
can be carefully drawn from this cursory analysis. 
 
107 See Devins, supra note 1, at 1674–84 (discussing state court considerations in deciding 
same-sex marriage). 
108 See generally Shepherd, supra note 38 (arguing that judges seeking reappointment 
“vote . . . strategically” as much or more than elected judges). 
109 Again, these topics were picked because of their often contentious nature and knowledge 
of the existence of at least some case law and/or public opinion on each topic.  For ex-
ample, equalizing public school funding has been a big topic in states since the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 
(1972), in which the Court held that the right to an equal education is not a fundamental 
right under the U.S. Constitution.  Similarly, there are constant litigation and public opi-
nion polls on same-sex marriage and civil unions.  Eminent domain has been a hot topic 
since the Court’s ruling in Kelo v. City of New London.  545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (holding 
that the City of New London’s redevelopment plan, promising to bring economic growth 
and new jobs to the plighted area, qualified as constitutionally permissible “public use” 
under the Fifth Amendment). 
Dec. 2010] PUBLIC OPINION AND STATE SUPREME COURTS 481 
 
B. Limitations 
Limitations of this analysis are numerous.  Regression models are 
not used.  The analysis does not account for potentially relevant fac-
tors that could explain the below-stated outcomes, such as the ideol-
ogy of the state supreme court justices.  Importantly, because of the 
dearth of systematic reporting of state public opinion and state su-
preme court opinions, the public opinion poll data used does not al-
ways directly correlate with the state supreme court opinions.110  Pub-
lic opinion polls do not necessarily predate the high court case, 
either.111  Finally, the amount of available data is limited by the availa-
bility of state public opinion, by the issues that have come before the 
state high courts, and by the overlap between these two sets. 
Despite these limitations, we believe the public opinion polls are a 
useful tool for analysis based on our above discussion of features that 
would seem to make state supreme courts more democratically ac-
countable to the public—particularly the greater knowledge base of a 
state supreme court justice about state opinion by virtue of being a 
member of the state and being actively involved in multiple areas of 
state government and life.112  Thus, we take a cautious first step in 
comparing public opinion with state supreme court decision making. 
C. Public Opinion and State Supreme Court Decision Making:  Existing 
Studies   
With close to 90% of state supreme court justices facing some type 
of retention election,113 it is to be expected that public opinion will 
directly influence state court decision making (either the substance 
of a decision or—in states with docket control—the decision whether 
to hear a case).  In states with contested elections, state justices, like 
other politicians, “have a tendency to vote in accordance with per-
ceived constituency preferences on visible issues, simply because the 
 
110 For example, a state poll about support for same-sex marriage may be used to indicate 
public opinion about same-sex parentage and adoption when a case on the latter comes 
before the state high court. 
111 Public opinion polls predating the relevant state supreme court opinion are obviously 
optimal, as they indicate a known public sentiment in existence before the court’s ruling.  
This makes it more likely that the court is aware of the public sentiment and can kno-
wingly choose to act or not act in accordance with it. 
112 See supra notes 89–99 and accompanying text (discussing the characteristics of state su-
preme court justices). 
113 See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1105 app. 
2 (2007). 
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failure to do so is politically dangerous.”114  Indeed, elected officials 
and judges alike fear challenge and defeat even when there is little to 
no chance of it occurring.115  “[R]egardless of how safe their positions 
are, public officials in an electoral setting often fear the voters.”116 
Evidence on the role of public opinion focuses on the impact of 
judicial elections.  Studies show that particular issues, such as crime 
and the death penalty, get judges subject to all election types (parti-
san, nonpartisan, and retention) to consider public opinion.  In a 
famous statement about the effect of judicial elections, former Cali-
fornia Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus stated that “[t]here’s no way 
a judge is going to be able to ignore the political consequences of 
certain decisions, especially if he or she has to make them near elec-
tion time.  That would be like ignoring a crocodile in your bath-
tub.”117 
An eight-state study of state supreme court death penalty cases 
analyzing, among other things, age of justices, term length, ideolo-
gies, and case facts, similarly determined that competition in states 
with partisan and non-partisan ballots encourage conservative voting 
patterns for justices who otherwise might vote to overturn death sen-
tences.118  A different study focusing on death penalty cases in four 
state supreme courts found a statistically significant relationship be-
tween the process for electing judges and voting of liberal justices 
with the conservative majority in death penalty cases.119 
Moreover, a study by Elisha Savchak and A.J. Barghothi found that 
there was “overwhelming evidence of the constraining effect of reten-
tion mechanisms” and concluded, unsurprisingly, that judges are 
more influenced by those who must retain them than those who 
 
114 Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives:  Elections and Judicial Politics in the American 
States, 23 AM. POL. Q. 485, 489 (1995). 
115 Melinda Gann Hall, Competition as Accountability in State Supreme Court Elections, in 
RUNNING FOR JUDGE:  THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS 165, 167 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007) (noting that from 1980–2000, although 
only 5.6% of House of Representatives incumbents running for reelection were defeated, 
House members facing reelection continued to employ numerous strategies to secure 
votes). 
116 See Hall, supra note 114, at 488. 
117 Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, 73 A.B.A. J. 52, 58 (1997). 
118 Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts, Context, and 
Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice, 59 J. POL. 1206, 1221–23 (1997). 
119 See Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J. 
POL. 427, 431 (1992) (describing a Louisiana case study that found that liberal justices 
were more likely to disregard their personal preferences and vote according to constitu-
ent preferences when facing reelection).  The four state supreme courts studied were the 
Texas Criminal Court of Appeals, the North Carolina Supreme Court, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court, and the Kentucky Supreme Court.  Id. at 434. 
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place them on the bench.120  Using a very large data set covering fif-
teen states with retention elections, examining all criminal cases (not 
just death penalty cases), and controlling for judge ideology, Savchak 
and Barghothi found that state supreme court judges are influenced 
by their retention constituencies, but more so near the end of their 
term when their retention election is near.121  A study by Joanna 
Shepherd unsurprisingly found the strongest results with judges fac-
ing partisan reelection, with results substantially weaker for judges re-
tained through non-partisan or retention election.122  Appointed 
judges, on the other hand, responded far less to the will of the elec-
torate and more to the will of the governor or legislature that ap-
pointed them.123  Finally, as would be expected, studies show that 
judges in their last term before mandatory retirement, and thus ac-
countable to no one, responded less to political will of any sort than 
other judges.124 
Of course, public opinion can only influence those issues of which 
the public actually is aware and on which it has formed an opinion.  
Indeed, the reason that political scientists have focused their energy 
on the death penalty and other criminal justice issues is tied to the 
salience of these issues with voters.125  In Georgia (a state with con-
tested elections), a state “Supreme Court justice acknowledged that 
the elected justices of that court may have overlooked errors, leaving 
 
120 Savchak & Barghothi, supra note 70, at 396. 
121 Id. at 400, 405. 
122 Shepherd, supra note 48, at 171. 
123 Id. at 192. 
124 Id. at 190, 192.  Shepherd’s study also indicates that judge voting changes immediately 
after election of a governor from the opposite party than previously held office, suggest-
ing that judges use the governor’s party affiliation as a proxy for the retention 
agent/voter’s preferences.  Id. at 193.  For one of the most recent writings on the death 
penalty, see Paul Brace & Brent D. Boyea, State Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the 
Practice of Electing Judges, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 360, 360 (2008) (“On the highly salient issue 
of the death penalty, mass opinion and the institution of electing judges systematically in-
fluence court composition and judge behavior.”).  See also Paul Brace & Brent D. Boyea, 
Judicial Selection Methods and Capital Punishment in the American States, in RUNNING FOR 
JUDGE:  THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, su-
pra note 115, at 188–89 [hereinafter Brace & Boyea, Judicial Selection Methods]; Stephen B. 
Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death:  Deciding Between the Bill of Rights 
and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 791–92 (1995) (“As a result of the 
increasing prominence of the death penalty in judicial elections as well as other cam-
paigns for public office, judges are well aware of the consequences to their careers of un-
popular decisions in capital cases.”). 
125 See Brace & Boyea, Judicial Selection Methods, supra note 124, at 188–89 (suggesting that the 
issue of capital punishment is ideally situated to test the effect of public opinion on judi-
cial decision making because it is a highly visible controversy that receives extensive me-
dia coverage). 
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federal courts to remedy them via habeas corpus, because ‘[federal 
judges] have lifetime appointments.  Let them make the hard deci-
sions.’”126  Even in retention states, a justice’s vote in capital cases can 
be used to turn “retention elections. . . into partisan contests.”127  In 
Colorado, the state’s governor led the charge to have voters remove 
one of his appointees based on that justice’s votes in capital cases.128  
In California, three justices lost retention elections in 1986 because of 
their votes in opposition to the death penalty,129 and in Tennessee, 
Justice Penny White lost her retention election in 1996 due to (per-
haps false) depictions of her vote in a capital case.130 
D. Public Opinion and State Supreme Court Decision Making:  A Step 
Beyond Criminal Justice Issues   
Outside of criminal justice issues, there is good reason to think 
both that state justices take account of public opinion and that the 
more electorally accountable justices are far more interested in pub-
lic opinion than are politically insulated justices.  In researching this 
question, we were able to match public opinion to state supreme 
court decisions in a total of twenty-seven instances ranging across top-
ics such as abortion, same-sex marriage, gun control, education, emi-
nent domain, immigration, and Indian gaming.  States are grouped 
by their retention election method,131 with each state’s judicial selec-
 
126 Bright & Keenan, supra note 124, at 799 (alteration in original) (quoting Katie Wood, Not 
Just a Rubber Stamp Anymore, FULTON CNTY. DAILY REP. (Ga.), Jan. 25, 1993, at 1, 5). 
127 James C. Foster, The Interplay of Legitimacy, Elections, and Crocodiles in the Bathtub:  Making 
Sense of Politicization of Oregon’s Appellate Courts, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1313, 1333–34 
(2003) (quoting Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy:  Probing 
the Myths of Judicial Reform, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 315, 326 (2001)). 
128 Bright & Keenan, supra note 124, at 786. 
129 See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty:  Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 689, 737 (1995) (“The 1986 electoral defeat of three justices of the California 
Supreme Court, largely in response to their positions on the constitutionality of the death 
penalty, is a clear example of how elected judges are increasingly accountable to electoral 
majorities.”). 
130 See Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary:  Can Justice Be Done amid Efforts to In-
timidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 314–15 
(1997) (discussing defeat of Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White due to the 
Republican Party’s portrayal of her vote in a capital case as indicia of an anti-death penal-
ty position). 
131 We use retention election method instead of the states’ initial selection method because 
we are interested in determining whether judges who face contested elections on a con-
tinuing basis are more democratically accountable.  For example, although Pennsylvania 
has partisan elections for the initial selection of state supreme court judges, retention 
elections are done as though a merit plan state.  THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra 
note 14, at 303 (listing both initial selection and retention selection methods for all fifty 
states).  While there is still likely to be some level of public pressure on these judges, 
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tion method represented by at least one data point.  A table of the 
data sets used for this analysis is located in the Appendix.  There is 
one data point for partisan election states, five data points for non-
partisan election states, ten points for merit plan states that make use 
of retention elections, and eleven points for gubernatorial/legislative 
appointment states.  It is interesting to note the lack of data points 
for partisan states.  The one data point available is consistent with our 
expectations, and so too, the lack of data is also consistent with our 
expectation that partisan states would be more cautious and make 
fewer rulings on high-salience issues.  And, because there is no public 
opinion on low-salience issues, there is no data in that area to com-
pare either.  Partisan states appear to be flying under the radar of 
public opinion, either matching state public opinion or artfully avoid-
ing decisions that will stir the masses.  Perhaps for the same reason, 
there is a limited amount of available data for nonpartisan judicial 
election states.132 
Nonpartisan states followed public opinion in four (arguably five) 
out of five available cases, on topics of same-sex marriage, medical 
marijuana, and eminent domain.133  Washington’s 2010 decision on 
medical marijuana is the only one that arguably does not follow pub-
lic opinion.  By ruling that a 1998 voter initiative only provided an af-
 
judges facing this type of retention election lose their seats less than 1% of the time.  See 
Joanna Shepherd, The Business of Judicial Elections (Oct. 2009) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/shepherd_business
ofelections_octdraft.pdf (noting that judges’ voting in cases involving business interests in 
states where they are initially selected in partisan elections but retained through retention 
elections more closely resembles that of judges who face retention elections). 
132 This may be a function of the manner in which data was gathered for this paper.  Re-
search assistants were asked to search for public opinion and supreme court cases on the 
following topics:  gay marriage, abortion, education, eminent domain, medical marijua-
na, gun control, immigration, crime (generally, and to the exclusion of the death penal-
ty), and miscellaneous.  It also may be that there was available public opinion data or an 
available state supreme court case, but either they did not align closely enough for com-
parison, or both items did not exist on the same topic. 
133 Ohio followed public opinion in an eminent domain decision—not surprisingly given the 
national rejection of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London in 
2005.  545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (holding that the use of eminent domain for the purpose 
of economic development satisfies the “public use” requirement of the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Takings Clause).  Both local and national outrage over that decision likely put 
Ohio’s Supreme Court on notice of the overwhelming rejection of the idea that govern-
ment could take private property for economic development.  See Joyce Howard Price, 
Drawing the Line on Eminent Domain:  States Rush to Counter Court Ruling, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 
9, 2005, at A1 (noting national rejection of Kelo and legislation proposed or introduced in 
30 states, including Ohio, to curb or restrict eminent domain powers); Correy E. Ste-
phenson, States Battle High Court Takings Case, LAW. WKLY. USA, Aug. 15, 2005 (describing 
public outcry and state legislative activity in response to the Kelo decision). 
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firmative defense to users of medical marijuana in state court pro-
ceedings, the Washington Supreme Court rejected arguments that 
police did not have probable cause to search the home of an individ-
ual with a document purporting to authorize his use of marijuana.134  
In narrowing the scope of the medical marijuana initiative, the Court 
arguably did not back public opinion.  At the same time, the Court 
followed the generally accepted understanding of what the initiative 
allowed (so, perhaps, the Court was following voter intent)135 and the 
marijuana user in question had more than two pounds of marijuana 
as well as scales and other drug paraphernalia (suggesting that he was 
not the type of individual whom voters sought to protect through the 
initiative).136 
In retention election states, decisions followed public opinion in 
six of ten cases.  Two cases where public opinion was not followed 
took place in Alaska and Iowa.  Alaska’s Supreme Court struck down 
a law requiring parental consent for minors before obtaining an 
abortion—a law heavily supported by the state population (80% in 
favor).137  The court held that the law unconstitutionally restricted a 
minor’s right to privacy, a right given to minors under the state con-
stitution.138  Though against public opinion, the decision was consis-
tent with the court’s precedent over the past ten years,139 which has 
upheld a minor’s privacy right while explicitly stating that a valid law 
could be implemented “which ensures that parents are notified so 
 
134 State v. Fry, 228 P.3d 1, 5 (Wash. 2010) (noting that authorization to use marijuana does 
not make the act of possessing and using marijuana noncriminal or negate any elements 
of the charged offense). 
135 See WASH. CITIZENS FOR MED. RIGHTS, THE WASHINGTON STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA ACT:  
A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS AND PHYSICIANS (1999), http://www.eventure.com/i692/Pages/
brochure.html (explaining the Act’s goal of providing exemption from criminal penalties 
for the use of medical marijuana). 
136 Fry, 228 P.3d at 3.  Three months after its Fry ruling, the Washington Supreme Court 
agreed to hear an appeal by the ACLU involving a medical marijuana claimant who lost 
her job because she lawfully consumed marijuana at her house for medicinal purposes.  
See Press Release, ACLU of Wash., State Supreme Court to Review Firing of Medical Mari-
juana Patient (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.aclu-wa.org/news/state-supreme-court-review-
firing-medical-marijuana-patient.  This case, unlike Fry, presents the Court with a sympa-
thetic plaintiff and, as such, will be a much better measure of whether the Washington 
Supreme Court is willing to risk voter backlash by narrowly interpreting the medical mari-
juana initiative. 
137 Lieutenant Governor Loren Leman Called on Alaska Supreme Court to End an Eight-Year Delay in 
Implementing Law to Protect Parental Rights, STATES NEWS SERV., Apr. 13, 2005. 
138 State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska (Planned Parenthood II), 171 P.3d 577, 582 (Alaska 
2007). 
139 See State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska (Planned Parenthood I), 35 P.3d 30, 41 (Alaska 
2001) (recognizing that fundamental reproductive rights include the right to an abor-
tion). 
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that they can be engaged in their daughters’ important decisions in 
these matters.”140 
Iowa’s Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a law that 
limited marriage to one man and one woman, despite lack of support 
for gay marriage at the time of the decision (30.4% in favor of gay 
marriage).141  Iowa, though selecting its judges through nonpartisan 
elections initially, retains judges through retention elections, similar 
to Pennsylvania.142  Pennsylvania was responsible for the two other 
cases decided by merit plan states that did not align with public opi-
nion, one of which held that workers compensation was available to 
illegal aliens despite strong support (70–80%) against granting more 
rights for illegal aliens.143 
Given the available data, we can see that all in all, regardless of the 
method of retention for state supreme court justices, on high-profile 
issues such as same-sex marriage, gun control, and abortion, among 
others, the courts generally align with public opinion.  That said, it is 
relatively clear that the retention method is relevant to the frequency 
that state courts decide cases contrary to popular public opinion.  
States where judges are appointed by the governor or legislature and 
serve long terms (to age seventy or life) had a high rate of ruling 
against public opinion.  Nonpartisan elected justices voted in line 
with public opinion in at least 80% of cases used in this preliminary 
analysis.  The limited amount of data for state courts using partisan 
 
140 Planned Parenthood II, 171 P.3d at 579. 
141 For further discussion of the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision and the role of the public, 
see Devins, supra note 1, at 1680 (2010) (contending that the political climate in Iowa was 
much more tolerant of same-sex marriage than opinion poll data suggests).  In 2010, 
three of these Justices lost retention bid, presumably because of their votes on same-sex 
marriage.  See supra note 75.  In making sense of this electoral defeat, public opinion on 
same-sex marriage is highly salient.  Other factors at play included the role of out-of-state 
interests in funding this electoral campaign (something that could have been anticipated 
by Iowa Justices) and the nation-wide anti-incumbent malaise in 2010 (something that 
could not have been anticipated).  For additional discussion, see Devins, supra note 17, at 
88–102 (discussing role of national interests in resisting state court efforts to legalize 
same-sex marriage).  See also Sandy Adkins, Anti-Incumbent Mood Extends to Court-Related 
Elections, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, News Release, Nov. 3, 2010, available at 
http://www.ncsc.org/newsroom/news-releases/2010/election-roundup.aspx  (noting an-
ti-incumbency sentiment in 2010 elections). 
142 See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 14, at 303 tbl.5.6. 
143 See Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 810 A.2d 99, 109 (Pa. 2002) 
(upholding an award for an unauthorized alien under the Workers’ Compensation Act).  
Public opinion found 72% of Pennsylvanians supported stricter immigration laws, and 
82% opposed granting drivers’ licenses to illegal aliens.  See Pennsylvania, FED’N AM. 
IMMIGR. REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=research_
polldataPA (last visited Nov. 14, 2010) (reporting the results of a poll asking likely voters 
in Pennsylvania their views on immigration issues). 
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and nonpartisan election schemes is consistent with the expectancy 
that those courts would prove more democratically accountable to 
the public than courts with merit plan and appointed justices.  Fur-
thermore, the limited data for nonpartisan, and particularly partisan 
selection states, may suggest that those courts are less inclined to hear 
high-salience cases in the first place, and second, less inclined to rule 
against the public if the retention method is another partisan or 
nonpartisan election. 
Finally, appointed courts appear even less likely to follow public 
opinion than would be expected given that judges do not face voters 
for retention of their seats.  Merit selection courts aligned with public 
opinion 60% of the time, while appointed state supreme courts paral-
leled public opinion in only 64% of cases.  These two types of courts 
were expected to be less accountable to the public than partisan and 
nonpartisan selection courts, and there is reason to believe this is true 
given the higher number of high-salience cases heard in each of 
these types of courts.  Resolving a higher number of visible cases in-
creases the possibility of greater media attention and scrutiny, includ-
ing criticism for the court and its justices.  We would expect justices 
subject to partisan and nonpartisan elections to avoid this attention, 
or seek it only when ruling in support of public opinion.  The overall 
data here indicates possible support for this expectancy.  However, 
further research is necessary. 
E. Money, Judicial Elections, and State Supreme Court Decision Making:  
Low-Salience Issues and Business Interests   
Given the dearth of public opinion data on state supreme court 
decisions for high-salience issues, it is no surprise that there is virtual-
ly no public opinion on low-salience issues that come before state su-
preme courts.  However, the void in public opinion does not mean 
state supreme court justices are not influenced by outside forces 
when it comes to low-salience issues.  Quite the contrary, empirical 
and anecdotal evidence back up the commonsense claim that state 
justices who run in contested elections are sensitive to the business 
interests that fund their campaigns and run television ads.  To start, 
judges themselves recognize the role of money and its influence on 
both elections and court decisions:  in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal 
Co., a 2009 U.S. Supreme Court decision about the influence of cam-
paign contributions on state supreme court decision making,144 a coa-
 
144 The precise issue before the Court was whether a state justice needed to recuse himself 
from a case in which one of the parties had made significant campaign contributions to 
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lition of twenty-seven former chief justices filed an amicus brief stat-
ing that “[s]ubstantial financial support of a judicial candidate—
whether contributions to the judge’s campaign committee or inde-
pendent expenditures—can influence a judge’s future decisions, 
both consciously and unconsciously.”145  One Ohio Supreme Court 
justice was quoted as saying that he “never felt so much like a hooker 
down by the bus station in any race [he has] ever been in as [he] did 
in a judicial race.”146  On the more empirical end, a 2002 survey of 
2,428 state court judges done by Justice at Stake reported that almost 
half of the judges surveyed thought campaign contributions influ-
enced decisions.147 
Reports on the Texas, Ohio, Alabama, and Georgia Supreme 
Courts also call attention to the influence of donations on decisions.  
A study of the Texas Supreme Court revealed that petitioners to the 
court who had donated $250,000 or more were ten times more likely 
than a non-contributor to have a petition for discretionary review 
granted.148  A second study of the Texas Court (focusing on 1994–
1997 rulings) also concluded that “decisions follow dollars.”149  The 
study found that when contributions from plaintiffs and their lawyers 
 
the justice.  By a five to four vote, the Supreme Court concluded that recusal was re-
quired, noting that “there is a serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and reason-
able perceptions—when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a signifi-
cant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or 
directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.”  Ca-
perton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263–64 (2009). 
145 Brief of 27 Former Chief Justices and Justices as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22).  The brief also 
claimed that justices, as humans, were “fundamentally incapable of complete impartiality 
and indifference” and that there are some cases where a judge cannot recognize her own 
bias.  Id. at 6.  But cf. Brief of Ten Current and Former Chief Justices and Justices as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 
(2009) (No. 08-22) (showing there is a presumption, both in the public and in rulings by 
the United States Supreme Court, of judicial integrity). 
146 See Liptak & Roberts, supra note 104 (quoting Justice Paul E. Pfeifer of the Ohio Supreme 
Court).  Prior to being elected to the bench in 1992, Pfeifer served “one term in the 
[Ohio] House of Representatives and four terms in the [Ohio] Senate.”  Paul E. Pfeifer, 
Justice, OHIO JUD. CENTER, http://www.ohiojudicialcenter.gov/pfeifer.asp (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2010). 
147 Liptak & Roberts, supra note 104. 
148 Brief of The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law et al. as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioners, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. at 14, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 
08-22) (citing Pay to Play:  How Big Money Buys Access to the Texas Supreme Court, TEXANS FOR 
PUBLIC JUSTICE 10 (2001), http://info.tpj.org/docs/2001/04/reports/paytoplay/
paytoplay.pdf). 
149 Madhavi McCall, The Politics of Judicial Elections:  The Influence of Campaign Contributions on 
the Voting Patterns of Texas Supreme Court Justices, 1994–1997, 31 POL. & POL’Y 314, 315 
(2003). 
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exceeded contributions from defendant’s lawyers, there was an in-
creased probability of a vote for plaintiff:  “[w]hen the plaintiff con-
tributes more than the defendant, the probability of a vote for the 
plaintiff doubles,” but when all four parties contribute (parties and 
lawyers), justices vote consistently with their preferences.150  A similar 
study of the Georgia Supreme Court in 2003 found that in those cases 
where the conservative side contributed more than the liberal attor-
neys, the conservative side won; while when liberal attorneys contri-
buted more, their side won 65% of the time.151 
A twelve-year study of Ohio Supreme Court Justices found justices 
voting in favor of parties who had made campaign contributions 70% 
of the time.152  One justice voted in favor of his contributors 91% of 
the time153 and, in 2006, the New York Times reported that all justices 
in the majority of a 4-3 class action lawsuit had received campaign 
contributions from the defendant companies and that all justices in 
the dissent had accepted campaign contributions from lawyers for the 
plaintiff.154  A 2001 study of the Alabama Supreme Court looked at 
106 arbitration decisions between 1995 and 1999 and found a “re-
markably close correlation between a justice’s votes on arbitration 
cases and his or her source of campaign funds.”155  Justices funded by 
plaintiff’s lawyers opposed arbitration, while those funded by business 
supported arbitration—the correlation “pervades the entire area of 
the law.”156 
Finally, two studies done by Joanna Shepherd also found a busi-
ness influence on judicial elections.  She found that in 2004, a dona-
tion of $100,000 to a judge in a partisan election system increased the 
 
150 Id. at 326.  Breaking this down into numbers:  plaintiffs are six times more likely to get a 
justice’s vote when the contribution exceeds the defendants’ (62% versus 10% chance).  
Id. at 328.  Plaintiffs are seven times more likely to win if the plaintiff’s lawyer contributed 
more to the justice than defendant’s lawyers (56.6% versus 7.5%).  Id.  “Indeed, plaintiffs 
are rarely victorious absent contributions. . . .”  Id.  The study also finds that a justice is 
more likely to vote for a plaintiff if an election is imminent.  Id. at 329. 
151 Damon M. Cann, Justice for Sale?  Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 7 ST. 
POL. & POL’Y Q. 281, 287 (2007). 
152 Brief of The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law et al. as Amici Curiae, su-
pra note 148, at 15 (citing Liptak & Roberts, supra note 104).  The Brennan Center also 
reported that “[i]n a written survey of 2,428 state lower, appellate, and Supreme Court 
judges, almost half (46 percent) of the judges surveyed indicated a belief that campaign 
contributions to judges influence decisions.”  Id. at 18. 
153 Liptak & Roberts, supra note 104. 
154 Id. 
155 Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions:  A Case Study of Arbitration Law in Al-
abama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 646 (1999). 
156 Id. at 662. 
Dec. 2010] PUBLIC OPINION AND STATE SUPREME COURTS 491 
 
business’ chances of winning by 69% in a products liability case.157  
Her more recent study of the influence of business interests on state 
supreme courts found that a judge facing partisan reelection was 23% 
more likely to vote in favor of the business litigant in a tort case and 
14% more likely in a contract case.158  Shepherd also reports that the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce spent over $100 million on judicial elec-
tion campaigns between 2000 and 2003, and that between 2000 and 
2004, the Chamber of Commerce was successful in getting its candi-
date—all pro-business judges—elected in thirty-six of forty elec-
tions.159 
In highlighting the success of business interests in advancing their 
agendas, Shepherd and others make two related points that reinforce 
our claims about public opinion and state court decision making.  
First, justices may be especially influenced by business interests in rul-
ings on low-salience issues such as contracts and arbitration.  Second, 
business interests—when taking out their own advertisements—often 
emphasize crime and other high-salience issues.160  In this way, busi-
ness interests recognize that the nexus between public opinion and 
judicial decision making is largely limited to a handful of high-
salience issues. 
F. The Characteristics of Path-Breaking State Supreme Courts:  Lessons from 
Same-Sex Marriage161   
States that make use of contested elections, as noted above, pro-
vided us with very few data points about the linkage of public opinion 
on high-salience issues and state court decision making.  This sug-
gests that these state supreme courts steer away from divisive social 
issues.  Another measure of this phenomenon is to look at the cha-
racteristics of state supreme courts that have played a path-breaking 
role on a high-salience issue.  As we will now explain, an examination 
of state supreme court decision making on same-sex marriage reveals 
that politically insulated courts are apt to play a path-breaking role. 
From 1993 to 2009, seven state supreme courts interpreted their 
constitutions to provide expansive protections to same-sex couples.  
Four of these states mandated same-sex marriage (Massachusetts, Cal-
 
157 Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 670 (2008). 
158 Shepherd, supra note 131, at 22. 
159 Id. at 13. 
160 Id. at 14. 
161 This subpart is drawn from Devins, supra note 1, at 1674–84.  One of us, Neal Devins, is 
now researching the characteristics of path-breaking courts on a broader range of issues.  
This research is in too preliminary a state to be included in this essay. 
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ifornia, Connecticut, and Iowa); two mandated marriage or civil un-
ion protections (Vermont and New Jersey); one said that it would ap-
ply strict scrutiny review in assessing the state ban on same-sex mar-
riage (Hawaii).162  The most salient characteristic shared by all seven 
courts is their retention schemes.  None of the seven make use of 
contested judicial elections.163  Five are among the eleven states whose 
justices need not run for reelection:  two (Massachusetts and New Jer-
sey) are among the four states whose justices are not subject to ree-
lection or reappointment;164 two (Vermont and Connecticut) are 
from the six states that make use of a legislative or gubernatorial 
reappointments;165 one (Hawaii) is the only state that makes use of a 
judicial commission to reappoint justices.  The remaining two (Cali-
fornia and Iowa) are states that make use of retention elections—
elections where incumbent justices win around 99% of the time.166 
Of the seven path-breaking states, only California and Massachu-
setts allow voters to place constitutional amendment proposals on the 
ballot.167  For legislature-sponsored amendments, only two states 
(Iowa and Massachusetts) allow for an amendment to be sent to the 
voters with only majority (as opposed to supermajority) support from 
state lawmakers.168  Iowa and Massachusetts, however, are two of 
twelve states that require consideration of legislature-proposed con-
stitutional amendments in two successive sessions.169  Iowa’s constitu-
 
162 For the states mandating same-sex marriage, see Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 
2009); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. 
Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 
(Mass. 2003).  For the states mandating civil unions, see Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 
2006); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).  For Hawaii’s decision to apply strict scru-
tiny, see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
163 With respect to judicial appointments, two states make use of merit plan appointments 
(Hawaii and Iowa); four use gubernatorial appointments (California, New Jersey, Massa-
chusetts, and Vermont); and one uses legislative appointment (Connecticut).  See supra 
Table 1. 
164 In Massachusetts, justices serve until they are seventy.  In New Jersey, justices are subject 
to an initial gubernatorial reappointment and then serve until they are seventy.  See supra 
note 9. 
165 See supra note 9. 
166 See id. 
167 John F. Cooper, The Citizen Initiative Petition to Amend State Constitutions:  A Concept Whose 
Time Has Passed, or a Vigorous Component of Participatory Democracy at the State Level?, 28 N.M. 
L. REV. 227, 227 n.2 (1998).  For California’s rules, see CAL. CONST. art. 18, §§ 3–4.  Mas-
sachusetts allows voters to submit direct democracy initiatives to the state legislature for 
approval.  To reach the ballot, the initiative must be approved by fifty of the state’s two 
hundred lawmakers in two consecutive sessions.  MASS. CONST. art. 48, §§ 4–5. 
168 THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 14, at 14–15 tbl.1.2. 
169 Id. 
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tional amendment rate of 0.36 amendments per year is the fifth low-
est of all states; Massachusetts’ rate of 0.55 is eighth lowest.170 
Vermont and Connecticut have low constitutional amendment 
rates and impose particularly onerous requirements on lawmakers 
who want to put constitutional amendments on the ballot.171  Con-
necticut requires a three-fourths supermajority vote in each house in 
one session or a majority vote in each of two sessions (with an inter-
vening election between the two sessions).172  Vermont only allows 
amendments to be introduced once every four years, requires that 
amendments be passed in two consecutive legislative sessions, and re-
quires a two-thirds supermajority vote in the state senate for passage 
in the initial legislative session.173  New Jersey and Hawaii also place 
meaningful limits on constitutional amendment proposals.  Hawaii 
requires either a two-thirds supermajority vote in one session or a ma-
jority vote in two sessions.174  New Jersey similarly requires a three-
fifths supermajority vote (of all members) in one session or a majority 
vote in two sessions.175  All in all, path-breaker states are among the 
most politically insulated states in the nation. 
In addition to override and retention risks, the ability of state su-
preme court justices to control their dockets impacts whether a state 
court will play a path-breaker role.  States without docket control, as 
discussed in Part I, are more likely to take backlash risks into account.  
On same-sex marriage, three path-breaking states (Vermont, New Jer-
sey, Iowa) had no choice but to hear constitutional challenges to state 
law; the other four had discretion (although each of those states 
made use of somewhat different procedures).176  Against this back-
drop, it is not surprising that the two states (Vermont, New Jersey) 
that took middle ground positions—finding for civil unions, not 
same-sex marriage—were among the three states without docket con-
trol.177 
 
170 See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION:  THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 248–49 
(Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). 
171 See id.  Vermont has an amendment rate of 0.25 per year (second lowest); Connecticut’s 
amendment rate of 0.96 is well below the 2.9 mean but is around the median of all states. 
172 THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 14, at 14–15 tbl.1.2. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
177 In Iowa, state court justices risked electoral defeat by finding for same-sex marriage, not 
civil union.  For additional discussion, see supra notes 75 and 141. 
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The specific features of state constitutional systems seem to have 
played a key role in state supreme court decision making on same-sex 
marriage.  Politically insulated states are more willing to play a path-
breaking role and, in so doing, more likely to put the views of media 
and academic elites ahead of the mass public.  With that said, as one 
of us has written elsewhere, elected officials and voters were more 
supportive of extending marriage protections to same-sex couples in 
path-breaking states than in most other states.178  Moreover, while we 
think state experiences with same-sex marriage are instructive in un-
derstanding the nexus between democratic accountability and the 
propensity of state supreme courts to either back or buck public opi-
nion, we recognize that too much should not be read into a single 
case study. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
State supreme court justices are subject to democratic checks un-
imaginable to federal court judges.  Some of these checks cut in favor 
of state court justices taking public opinion into account (either by 
ruling in ways consistent with voter preferences or steering clear of 
controversy by refusing to hear certain cases).  The most notable of 
these “pro-voter” checks are judicial elections and direct-democracy 
initiatives.  At the same time, public awareness of state supreme court 
decision making is scant, and, consequently, there are relatively few 
issues in which voters will punish justices for their decisions.  More 
than that, justices in the fourteen states with contested elections are 
under increasing pressure to rule in ways that favor business interests, 
especially campaign contributors, on low-salience economic issues 
that matter to business constituencies but not voters. 
The ways in which voters and business interests will impact state 
justices is also tied to the unique structure of each state constitutional 
system.  In part, differences in retention schemes, docket control, 
and the procedures to amend state law call attention to the potential 
political vulnerability of justices (either to lose their seat outright or 
to have their decision overturned by lawmakers or voters).  Differ-
ences in state systems are also relevant because they speak to the types 
of individuals who serve on state supreme courts.  Justices who run in 
contested races look and think more like politicians and personally 
 
178 See Devins, supra note 1, at 1679–83 (discussing legislative action pertaining to marriage 
protections for same-sex couples in California, Connecticut, Iowa, and New Jersey and 
public support for judicially mandated same-sex marriage or civil unions in all path-
breaking states other than Vermont and Hawaii). 
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value the public validation that comes with electoral victory; justices 
who are not subject to contentious reappointment or reelection bat-
tles look more like legal professionals and are more likely to value 
their reputation among elites (bar groups, other judges, academics, 
and the media). 
Evidence on state supreme court decision making backs up these 
claims, although the evidence is too limited to reach definitive con-
clusions.  Studies on the role of public opinion in state supreme court 
decision making have largely focused on criminal issues, especially 
the death penalty.  Studies on the role of business interests have been 
limited to a handful of states and have not been systematic.  In this 
essay, we have supplemented existing studies on public opinion, but 
only in a limited way.  This essay, in other words, is but the first step, 
and a cautious one at that, given the limited data.  Considering both 
the increasing national importance of state court decision making 
and the increasing politicization and cost of state judicial elections, 
the questions we address become all the more urgent.  In the words 
of Justice Kennedy, “We weren’t talking about this [thirty] years ago 
because we didn’t have money in [judicial] elections.  Money in elec-
tions presents us with a tremendous challenge, a tremendous prob-
lem, and we are remiss if we don’t at once address it and correct it.”179  
Further data and research are necessary to determine how state su-
preme courts—the courts of last resort for the states, and the func-
tional courts of last resort ultimately for many—are influenced by 
public opinion and campaign contributor interests. 
 
179 Bill Moyers Journal, (PBS television broadcast Feb. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/02192010/transcript1.html (replaying a statement 
made by Justice Kennedy during the original airing of the PBS program Frontline:  Justice 
for Sale on Nov. 23, 1999).  An interesting statement in light of Kennedy’s recent deciding 
vote in Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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APPENDIX 
State Retention 
Method 
Issue Public  
Opinion 
Case Matches 
Public 
Opinion? 
Hawaii Guberna-
torial Ap-
pointment/ 
Commission 
Medical 
Mariju-
ana 
May 2000—
60% sup-
port passage 
of law mak-
ing medical 
marijuana 
legal180 
 
Feb. 2000—
77% favor 
state legisla-
ture passing 
law to allow 
seriously ill 
patients to 
use mariju-
ana for 
medical 
purposes if 
approved by 
medical 
doctor 
 
1998—63% 
support use 
of marijua-
na for me-
dicinal pur-
poses 
State v. 
Mallan181 
Yes 
 
180 Lynda Arakawa, Medical Marijuana Has Public Support, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, May 16, 
2000, at 1A. 
181 950 P.2d 178 (Haw. 1998) (holding that there is no fundamental right to possess and use 
marijuana for recreational purposes and stating that the issue of medical marijuana was 
not before the court). 
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State Retention 
Method 
Issue Public  
Opinion 
Case Matches 
Public 
Opinion? 
Hawaii Guberna-
torial Ap-
pointment/ 
Commission 
Gun 
Control 
1999—six in 
ten support 
outright ban 
on hand-
guns, and 
only one in 
six support 
an open 
carry law182
State v. 
Mendo-
za183  
Yes 
Maine Guberna-
torial Ap-
pointment/ 
Commission 
Gun 
Control 
2009—88% 
favor back-
ground 
checks at 
gun shows184 
 
2006—47% 
own gun in 
household 
 
 
 
 
 
Doe v. 
Portland 
Housing 
Authori-
ty185 
No 
 
182 Ken Kobayashi, Handgun Ban Has Majority Support, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Nov. 14, 
1999, at 1A.  Hawaii has strict gun laws, including registration, fingerprinting, and man-
datory background checks.  See HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-2 (2009) (stating the various re-
quirements for obtaining a permit to acquire a firearm); see also Mary Simms, How Difficult 
Is It to Buy a Gun in Hawaii?, HAWAII NEWS NOW, http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/
Global/story.asp?S=6385267 (describing the various steps needed for the purchase of a 
firearm, including taking a training test and waiting for a background check). 
183 920 P.2d 357 (Haw. 1996) (holding that the firearm permit law in question does not vi-
olate the right to bear arms under the Hawaii Constitution). 
184 Kevin Miller, The Legal Landscape:  Gun Control Bills in Maine Face Tough Challenges, 
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Me.), Nov. 19, 2009, at A1.  In 1987, Maine amended its constitu-
tion to make it more favorable to gun ownership.  Id.  The constitution previously stated 
that citizens had the right “to keep and bear arms for the common defense.”  Id.  (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).  In amended form, the constitution now provides that 
“every citizen has a right to keep and bear arms and this right shall never be questioned.”  
ME. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
185 656 A.2d 1200, 1202 (Me. 1995) (holing that state law prohibited municipalities from 
enacting stricter gun control laws than the state).   
498 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:2 
 
State Retention 
Method 
Issue Public  
Opinion 
Case Matches 
Public 
Opinion? 
New 
York 
Guberna-
torial Ap-
pointment / 
Commission  
Gun 
Control 
2000—72% 
say control-
ling gun 
ownership is 
more im-
portant than 
upholding 
the right to 
bear arms186
Hamilton 
v. Berretta 
U.S.A. 
Corp.187  
 
People v. 
Brown188  
No 
New 
York 
Guberna-
torial  
Appoint-
ment / 
Commission 
Educa-
tion 
2004—61% 
backed ad-
ditional 
funding of 
$5.6 billion 
for educa-
tion 
 
2001—60% 
say state 
spending on 
New York 
City schools 
should be 
increased  
 
 
 
Campaign 
for Fiscal 
Equity v. 
State189 
 
Campaign 
for Fiscal 
Equity v. 
State 
(2006)190 
Yes 
 
186 Gore Has Big Lead in New York Presidential Race, QUINNIPIAC U. (Apr. 6, 2000), 
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1318.xml?ReleaseID=606. 
187 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1059, 1061–62 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that handgun manufacturers do 
not owe a duty to exercise reasonable care in their marketing and distributing to people 
injured by their illegally obtained handguns). 
188 788 N.E.2d 1030, 1033 (N.Y. 2003) (discussing first and second degree criminal sale of a 
firearm statute).   
189 801 N.E.2d 326, 343, 348 (N.Y. 2003) (holding that state failed to fulfill the constitutional 
mandate to provide sound, basic education and directing state to implement reform in 
13-year lawsuit over whether under-funded schools violated state constitution). 
190 861 N.E.2d 50, 58–59 (N.Y. 2006) (upholding the allocation of money issued for the re-
forms). 
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New Jer-
sey 
Guberna-
torial to age 
seventy 
Gun 
Control 
1999—71% 
say control-
ling guns 
more im-
portant than 
protecting 
gun owners’ 
rights, and 
52% sup-
port com-
plete ban on 
handgun 
sales191
State v. 
Smith192 
Yes 
New Jer-
sey 
Guberna-
torial to age 
seventy 
Educa-
tion 
1998—52% 
support 
greater 
funding of 
poor school 
districts, 
and 41% 
support 
vouchers193 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abbot  v. 
Burke194 
Yes 
 
191 Parents Should Be Told of Girl’s Abortion, QUINNIPIAC U. (June 10, 1999), 
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1299.xml?ReleaseID=699. 
192 963 A.2d 281, 289 (N.J. 2009) (holding that prosecutors need not prove a criminal kno-
wingly possessed a defaced gun as long as gun was actually defaced). 
193 New Jersey Voters Want Limits on Abortion, QUINNIPIAC U. (Mar. 5, 1998), 
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1299.xml?ReleaseID=761. 
194 710 A.2d 450, 474 (N.J. 1998) (holding that school funding plan was unconstitutional as 
applied to special needs districts because it failed to satisfy the thorough and efficient 
education clause of the New Jersey Constitution and ordering remedial relief).   
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Public 
Opinion? 
New Jer-
sey 
Guberna-
torial to age 
seventy 
Abor-
tion—
parental 
notice 
law 
73%  of vot-
ers support 
parental no-
tice before 
minors can 
have abor-
tion195
Planned 
Parent-
hood of 
Central 
New Jersey 
v. Far-
mer196
No 
New 
Hamp-
shire 
Guberna-
torial to age 
seventy 
Educa-
tion 
2001—45% 
said educa-
tion funding 
most impor-
tant issue 
 
2008—10% 
said educa-
tion funding 
was most 
important 
issue 197 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Claremont 
School Dis-
trict v. 
Governor 
(2002)198  
 
Claremont 
School Dis-
trict v. 
Governor 
(1997)199 
Yes 
 
195 New Jersey Voters Split on Abortion Limits, QUINNIPIAC U. (Dec. 7, 2000), 
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1299.xml?ReleaseID=587. 
196 762 A.2d 620, 621 (N.J. 2000) (holding the Parental Notice for Abortion Act as unconsti-
tutional under equal protection principles). 
197 Andrew E. Smith, WMUR/Granite State Poll, U.N.H. SURVEY CENTER, 6 (Sept. 25 2008), 
available at http://www.unh.edu/survey-center/news/pdf/gsp2008_fall_govapp
92508.pdf. 
198 794 A.2d 744, 759 (N.H. 2002) (reasoning that existing scheme to finance education had 
deficiencies that were inconsistent with the state’s constitutional duty to provide adequate 
education). 
199 703 A.2d 1353, 1360 (N.H. 1997) (holding that the system for financing schools was dis-
proportionate and unreasonable within the meaning of the constitutional provision re-
quiring proportional and reasonable tax assessment, and that state-funded, constitution-
ally adequate public elementary and secondary education is a fundamental right). 
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Rhode 
Island 
Guberna-
torial/ Life 
Tenure 
Gun 
Control 
Gun owner-
ship in state 
mongst low-
est in nation 
at 13.3 %200
Mosby v. 
Devine201  
Yes 
Rhode 
Island 
Guberna-
torial/ Life 
Tenure 
Educa-
tion 
2001—
general as-
sembly 
should in-
crease state 
funding for 
public 
schools by a 
lot, 49%, a 
little, 29%, 
not at all, 
8%, don’t 
know, 
14%202 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
City of 
Pawtucket 
v. Sun-
dlun203  
No 
 
200 Press Release, Violence Pol’y Ctr., States with Higher Gun Ownership and Weak Gun 
Laws Lead Nation in Gun Death (May 6, 2009), http://www.vpc.org/press/0905
gundeath.htm. 
201 851 A.2d 1031, 1039–40, 1044, 1051 (R.I. 2004) (holding that the state constitutional 
right to bear arms, though military in context, extends to individuals, but the legislature 
has the ability to reasonably regulate that right by not granting a hearing for a denial of a 
firearm license). 
202 Providence Residents Say Public Schools Are Moving in Right Direction, BROWN U. NEWS SERV. 
(Feb. 13, 2001), www.brown.edu/Departments/Taubman_Center/polls/00-080.html. 
203 662 A.2d 40, 42, 55 (R.I. 1995) (holding that the state method of school funding was con-
stitutional and did not violate the education clause or equal protection provision of the 
state constitution, and that the education clause did not confer a right or guarantee of 
receiving an “equal, adequate and meaningful education”). 
502 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:2 
 
State Retention 
Method 
Issue Public  
Opinion 
Case Matches 
Public 
Opinion? 
Ala-
bama 
Partisan Gay 
Mar-
riage 
2005—54% 
strongly 
support 
amendment 
to prohibit 
gay mar-
riage204
Ex parte 
H.H.205 
 
Ex parte 
J.M.F.206 
Yes 
Georgia Non-
Partisan 
Same-
Sex 
Mar-
riage 
2004—50% 
of Georgia 
voters op-
pose any 
form of rec-
ognition for 
homosexual 
couples207
Perdue v. 
Kelly208 
Yes 
Wash-
ington 
Non-
Partisan 
Medical 
Mariju-
ana 
1998—
Medical Ma-
rijuana ap-
proved by 
voter initia-
tive 
State v. 
Fry209  
No 
 
204 Press Release, Ctr. for Governmental Servs. at Auburn Univ., Attitudes About Same-sex 
Marriage Amendment, (Feb. 9, 2005), http://www.askalabama.org/press_releases/
february2005/Logo%20Study%20Vol%202%20No%201%20Marriage%20Amendment
%20Winter%202005.pdf. 
205 830 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., concurring specially) (“[H]omosexual con-
duct of a parent . . . creates a strong presumption of unfitness. . . .  Alabama expressly 
does not recognize same-sex marriages or domestic partnerships.  Homosexual conduct 
is . . . a violation of the laws of nature and of nature’s God . . . .”). 
206 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Ala. 1998) (stating that homosexual relationships are “neither 
legal in this state, nor moral in the eyes of most of its citizens.” (quoting Ex parte D.W.W., 
717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
207 Exit Poll:  Few Georgia Voters Support Gay Marriage, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 3, 2004, available 
at http://new.accessnorthga.com/detail.php?n=175090&c=2. 
208  632 S.E. 2d 110 (Ga. 2006) (reinstating voter-approved ban on gay marriage previously 
struck down by county court). 
209 228 P.3d 1, 7–8 (Wash. 2010) (“[A]n authorized user of medical marijuana will have an 
affirmative defense only if he or she shows full compliance with the Act.  However, an af-
firmative defense does not negate probable cause for a search in the case, conducted with 
a valid warrant. . . . [The defendant] could not avail himself of the compassionate use de-
fense because his claimed health conditions did not qualify under the Act.”). 
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Ohio Non-
Partisan 
Emi-
nent 
Domain 
2007—82% 
of voters 
oppose us-
ing eminent 
domain to 
take proper-
ty for eco-
nomic de-
velopment, 
and 50% say 
government 
has abused 
eminent 
domain in 
the past210
Norwood 
v. Hor-
ney211 
Yes 
Oregon Non-
Partisan 
Same-
sex Mar-
riage 
2004—state 
constitu-
tional 
amendment 
banning 
same-sex 
marriage 
passed with 
57% sup-
port 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 2005, 
the Ore-
gon Su-
preme 
Court 
nullified 
3,000 
same-sex 
marriag-
es212  
Yes 
 
210 Press Release, Quinnipiac Univ., Ohio Gov’s Approval up as Voters Get to Know Him 
(Mar. 21, 2007), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1322.xml?ReleaseId=1028&ss=print. 
211 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1145–46 (Ohio 2006) (holding that economic or financial benefit alone 
is insufficient to satisfy the public use requirement of the takings clause in Ohio’s state 
constitution). 
212 Almanac, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 2009, at 19. 
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Wiscon-
sin 
Non-
Partisan 
Same-
sex Mar-
riage 
2006—
39.4% ap-
prove of gay 
marriage, 
58.7% ap-
prove of civ-
il unions213 
In 2009, 
the Wis-
consin 
Supreme 
Court 
held do-
mestic 
partner 
registry 
does not 
violate 
the state 
constitu-
tional 
amend-
ment 
banning 
gay mar-
riage214  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
213 Press Release, Univ. of Wis. Survey Ctr., Badger Poll No. 22, Release No. 3:  Same-sex 
Marriage, Unions, and Referendum (July 17, 2006), http://www.uwsc.wisc.edu/BP22
PressRelease_Death_Samesex.pdf. 
214 Arthur Zettel, Letter to the Editor, Gays Pushing Their Beliefs on Everyone, THE SHEBOYGAN 
PRESS (Sheboygan, Wis.), Nov. 20, 2009, at A05. 
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Califor-
nia 
Merit Plan Medical 
Mariju-
ana215  
2004—74% 
supported 
legalizing 
marijuana 
for medical 
use under a 
doctor’s su-
pervision 
 
1996—56% 
supported 
legalized 
marijuana 
for medical 
use under 
doctor su-
pervision216 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
People v. 
Kelly217 
Yes 
 
215 This came up as a voter-initiated ballot measure in 1996 and passed 56% to 44%.  The 
Field Poll’s Record in Measuring Statewide Ballot Propositions in California (1994–Present), 
FIELD POLL, http://www.field.com/fieldpoll/propositions.html (last visited Nov. 14, 
2010). 
216 See Press Release, The Field Poll, Strong Support for Implementation of Prop. 215, the 
State’s Medical Marijuana Law (Jan. 30, 2004), http://www.field.com/fieldpollonline/
subscribers/Rls2105.pdf. 
217 222 P.3d 186, 209–11 (Cal. 2010) (striking down law placing limits on the amount of 
medical marijuana a patient may legally possess and stating that only voters can change 
amendments added to the state constitution through the initiative process); see also Tha-
deus Greenson, State Court Ruling Shoots Down Medical Marijuana Restrictions, TIMES 
STANDARD (Eureka, Cal.), Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.times-standard.com/ci_14245511. 
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Arizona Merit Plan Indian 
Gaming 
1999—69% 
favor reser-
vation casi-
nos in the 
state and 
75% favor 
renewal of 
Indian gam-
ing com-
pacts218
Salt River 
Pima-
Maricopa 
Indian 
Cmty v. 
Hull219  
Yes 
Arizona Merit Plan Same-
sex Mar-
riage 
2004—60% 
opposed al-
lowing 
same-sex 
couples to 
marry; 49% 
opposed to 
the state re-
cognizing a 
same-sex 
marriage 
that is per-
formed in 
another 
state220 
In 2004, 
the Ari-
zona Su-
preme 
Court re-
fused to 
hear a 
case chal-
lenging 
the deni-
al of a gay 
couple’s 
applica-
tion for a 
marriage 
license221 
 
 
 
Yes  
Alaska Merit Plan Abor- 2005—80% State v. No 
 
218 Betty Beard, Indian Gaming Support Strong in State, Survey Says, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 30, 
1999, at 5B.   
219 945 P.2d 818, 826 (Ariz. 1997) (resolving dispute over gaming contract in favor of tribe). 
220 Recent State Polls on Same-Sex Marriage & Civil Unions, NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, 2 
(May 6, 2005), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/May2005
StatePolls.pdf. 
221 Michael Kiefer, Same-Sex Marriage Ban Intact in Arizona; High Court Refuses to Consider Ap-
peal, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 26, 2004, at 1A. 
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tion—
Parental 
Consent 
support 
abortion pa-
rental con-
sent law222
Planned 
Parent-
hood of 
Alaska223
Florida Merit Plan Educa-
tion 
2006—37% 
agree, 52% 
disagree, 
and 12% 
not sure 
that giving 
vouchers to 
students in 
poorly per-
forming 
schools so 
they can at-
tend private 
schools is a 
good use of 
public edu-
cation 
funds224 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bush v. 
Holmes225 
Yes 
Iowa Merit Plan Same- 2009— Varnum v. No 
 
222 Lieutenant Governor Loren Leman Called on Alaska Supreme Court to End an Eight-Year Delay in 
Implementing Law To Protect Parental Rights, supra note 137. 
223 171 P.3d 577, 585 (Alaska 2007) (holding parental consent law unconstitutional). 
224 Catherine Dolinski & William March, Poll Shows Education Is Concern Locally, TAMPA TRIB., 
May 31, 2006, at 1. 
225 919 So. 2d 392, 398 (Fla. 2006) (vouchers that allowed students at failing public schools 
to attend private schools held unconstitutional). 
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sex Mar-
Mar-
riage 
30.4% fa-
vored ruling 
that would 
allow same-
sex mar-
riage226
Brien227 
Pennsyl-
vania 
Merit Plan Immi-
gration 
2007—72 % 
favor stricter 
immigration 
laws 
 
2008—82% 
oppose 
granting 
drivers’ li-
censes to 
illegal 
aliens228 
Reinforced 
Earth Co. 
v. Workers’ 
Compensa-
tion Ap-
peal 
Board229 
No 
Pennsyl-
vania 
Merit Plan Same-
sex Mar-
riage 
2004—63% 
oppose 
same-sex 
marriage, 
50% oppose 
civil un-
ions230
T.B. v. 
L.R.M.231 
 
Devlin v. 
City of 
Philadel-
phia232
No 
 
226 Jason Hancock, Same-Sex Marriage Opponents Face Uphill Fight in Iowa, IOWA INDEP., Apr. 3, 
2009, http://iowaindependent.com/13558/same-sex-marriage-opponents-face-uphill-
fight-in-iowa. 
227 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009) (declaring unconstitutional a state statute limiting mar-
riage to a man and a woman). 
228 Pennsylvania, supra note 143 (reporting polls). 
229 810 A.2d 99, 106 (Pa. 2002) (holding that illegal aliens are eligible for workers’ compen-
sation). 
230 Press Release, Quinnipiac Univ., Leave Gay Marriage to States, Not U.S. Constitution, 
Pennsylvania Voters Tell Quinnipiac University Poll; But Voters Oppose Gay Marriage 2-1 
(Mar. 18, 2004), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1327.xml?ReleaseID=300&ss=print. 
231 786 A.2d 913, 918–19 (Pa. 2001) (stating that the nature of the relationship between a 
mother and her girlfriend was irrelevant to whether the girlfriend stood in loco parentis to 
child and holding that girlfriend had standing to seek partial custody of child under doc-
trine of in loco parentis). 
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Tennes-
see 
Merit Plan Educa-
tion 
1992—
73.2% 
agreed with 
lower court 
ruling to 
equalize 
school fund-
ing233
Tennessee 
Small 
School Sys-
tems v. 
McWher-
ter234 
Yes 
Mary-
land 
Merit Plan Abor-
tion 
1992—62% 
of voters 
approved 
referendum 
that libera-
lized Mary-
land’s abor-
tion laws235
Kelly v. 
Vote Know 
Coalition 
of Mary-
land236 
Yes 
 
 
 
232 862 A.2d 1234, 1243 (Pa. 2004) (upholding city’s extension of employment benefits to 
life partners and stating that even though city had designated a life partnership as a ma-
rital status, the city had not legislated in the area of marriage). 
233 Univ. of Tenn. Soc. Sci. Research Inst., Tennessee Poll (Mar. 2, 1992) (unpublished sur-
vey) (on file with author). 
234 851 S.W.2d 139, 140–41 (Tenn. 1993) (holding that the state constitution requires free 
public schools that afford substantially equal educational opportunities to all students 
and finding that that state school funding program violated equal protection). 
235 Todd Spangler, Abortion Measure Decisive Winner, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1992, at B1. 
236 626 A.2d 959, 966 (Md. 1993) (rejecting anti-abortion group challenge to referendum). 
